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Booker Disparity and Data-Driven Sentencing 
JOSHUA M. DIVINE* 
Sentencing disparity among similar offenders has increased at a disconcerting rate 
over the last decade. Some judges issue sentences twice as harsh as other judges on 
the same court, so a defendant’s sentence often depends substantially on which judge 
is randomly assigned to the defendant’s case. The old mandatory sentencing 
guidelines repressed disparity but only by causing unwarranted uniformity. The 
advisory guidelines swing the pendulum toward the opposite extreme, and this 
problem promises to grow worse as the lingering effects of the old regime diminish. 
 
This Article proposes a systemdata-driven appellate reviewto curb sentencing 
disparity without re-introducing unwarranted uniformity. In a system where 
sentencing judges possess significant discretion, only meaningful appellate review 
can restrain the tendency for sentencing practices to deviate substantially between 
judges. Discretionary sentencing decisions are currently reviewed for abuse of 
discretion, which leads some judges to issue much harsher or much more lenient 
sentences than other judges. Congress can mitigate this problem of inter-judge 
disparity by changing the standard of review, creating a rebuttable presumption that 
outlier sentences among similar offenders are unreasonable. The data the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission collects on over 70,000 criminal cases annually can be used 
to define categories of similar offenders. Culling outlier sentences through data-
driven appellate review would increase judicial awareness of sentences issued by peer 
judges, restricting inter-judge disparity without incurring unwarranted uniformity. 
  
 * Deputy Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney General of Missouri. Yale Law School, J.D. 
2016. All views are my own. I am grateful to members of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, the Hon. 
William Pryor and Professor Rachel Barkow, as well as Professors Kate Stith, Daniel Kelly, Marah 
McLeod, Derek Muller, and Mark Osler for their insightful comments on earlier drafts or 
conversations about this project. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Federal sentencing policy leaves a substantial portion of each 
sentence subject to the identity of the sentencing judge. A card randomly 
drawn from a shuffled decka method some courts have used to assign 
judges to cases1can alter the length of a sentence by several years. 
Between 2007 and 2011, one judge in the District of Nebraska sentenced 
drug offenders to a median 60 months while a colleague on the same 
court sentenced drug offenders to a median twice that amount.2 This 
inter-judge disparity has swelled since the Supreme Court decision in 
United States v. Booker3 rendered the sentencing guidelines advisory, 
and the disparity shows signs of only increasing. 
Booker nullified an important part of the Sentencing Reform Act, 
which had created the Sentencing Commission and clothed the 
Commission with authority to create the mandatory Sentencing 
Guidelines. Reducing inter-judge disparity was a central aimif not the 
central aim4of the Act.5 Congress sought to achieve this aim by 
pursuing an ideal of uniformity that required judges to sentence 
defendants within complicated and narrow guideline ranges that judges 
were to calculate based on facts they found.6 The Act had no shortage of 
faults,7 and it reduced inter-judge disparity at the cost of increasing 
unwarranted uniformity,8 but it successfully reduced inter-judge 
disparity in measurable ways through the mandatory guidelines.9 
 1. E.g., D. MINN. ORDER FOR ASSIGNMENT OF CASES 7 (Dec. 1, 2008). 
 2. Richard G. Kopf, Judge-Specific Sentencing Data for the District of Nebraska, 25 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 50, 51 tbl. 7 (2012). One of these judges was a senior judge and may not have had a random 
sampling of cases, but the average difference between active judges was still twenty-two percent in 
drug cases. Id. 
 3. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 4. KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL 
COURTS 104 (1998); Ryan W. Scott, Booker’s Ironies, 47 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 695, 714 (2016) (“Among 
Congress’s primary objectives . . . was the reduction of inter-judge disparity . . . .”). Certainly 
“[e]liminating unwarranted sentencing disparity was the primary goal of the Sentencing Reform Act,” 
even if eliminating inter-judge disparity, in particular, was not. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN 
YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING 79 (2004). 
 5. Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L. REV. 
1, 3 (2010) (noting that the Sentencing Reform Act was intended to drive away sentencing disparity 
created by “the philosophy, politics, or biases of the sentencing judge”). 
 6. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2012). 
 7. See, e.g., STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 51–60, 68, 82, 94, 98, 115. 
 8. Paul J. Hofer, Data, Disparity, and Sentencing Debates: Lessons from the TRAC Report on 
Inter-Judge Disparity, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 37, 40 (2012) (noting that Guidelines departures are 
sometimes necessary to prevent disparity). 
 9. FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 97-99 (“The federal sentencing 
guidelines have made significant progress toward reducing disparity caused by judicial discretion.”); 
James M. Anderson et al., Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271, 294 (1999) (finding evidence that interjudge disparity fell 
thirty-six percent in a six-year span following the Sentencing Reform Act). But see U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, supra note 4, at 98 (showing that judicial disparity increased for robbery and immigration 
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In a post-Booker world where pre-defined guideline ranges are 
advisory only, the Act has lost the element most responsible for reducing 
inter-judge disparity, and nothing remotely sufficient has replaced that 
element. Instead, “copious evidence” now shows that Booker decimated 
the central purpose of the Act.10 To be sure, Booker is responsible for only 
a slight decrease in aggregate sentence averages (although average drug 
sentences decreased substantially).11 But Booker instigated significant 
disparity between the individual sentences that make up those aggregate 
averages when Booker augmented judicial discretion and reduced 
meaningful appellate review.12 Booker has at least doubled how 
important a specific judge is to the outcome of a sentence in certain 
districts, and the effect is even greater after controlling for mandatory 
minimum sentences because those sentences create an artificial 
uniformity that masks variation.13 The example from the District of 
Nebraska also understates the extent of inter-judge disparity because 
judges in that district adhere to the recommendations of the advisory 
guidelines at higher rates than average, so offenders in that district 
experience below-average disparity.14 This disparity is driven not only 
from differences in judicial philosophy, but also from the basic lack of 
awareness many judges have of sentences their peer judgesthat is, 
other judges on the same courtimpose, which in turn makes many 
judges unaware of their own harsh or lenient tendencies.15 
This problem is likely to intensify. Although many judges continue 
to issue sentences within calculated ranges established by the advisory 
guidelines, that practice is attributable in part to the inertia of judges who 
grew used to sentencing when those ranges were mandatory and have not 
deviated much from their original practices. One should not expect newly 
appointed judges to exhibit the same tendency.16 
What is to be done about a system that does not achieve its central 
aim of reducing arbitrary disparities between offenders? No shortage of 
offenses); STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 106 (arguing that inter-judge disparity was exaggerated 
before the Sentencing Reform Act). 
 10. Frank O. Bowman, III, Dead Law Walking: The Surprising Tenacity of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1227, 1266 (2014). 
 11. Jeffery Ulmer & Michael T. Light, Beyond Disparity: Changes in Federal Sentencing After 
Booker and Gall, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 333, 335 (2011); Frank O. Bowman, III, Prolegomenon on the 
Status of the Hopey, Changey Thing in American Criminal Justice, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 93, 94 (2010) 
(reporting that within-range sentences dropped from 70.9 % before Booker to 54.8 % in fiscal year 2010). 
 12. Bowman, III, supra note 10, at 1261, 1266–67. 
 13. Scott, supra note 5, at 5, 33 (reporting, among other things, that several judges in the  
post-Booker period depart three times as often as other judges).  
 14. Kopf, supra note 2, at 51. 
 15. Kopf, supra note 2, at 51. 
 16. See Nancy Gertner, Supporting Advisory Guidelines, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 261, 270 (2009) 
(identifying adherence to the Guidelines post-Booker as the result of “habits ingrained during twenty 
years of mandatory Guideline sentencing”). 
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scholars have suggested abolishing and replacing the Guidelines.17 Yet 
the majority of judges favor the Guidelines in their advisory state.18 
Judges tend to appreciate the Guidelines and find them helpful;19 
presumably, they disfavor revolutionary departures from the current 
system. Moreover, the existing proposals seek other goals, not a 
reduction in inter-judge disparity. This Article contributes to the 
literature by providing the first reform tailored specifically toward 
attacking inter-judge disparity in the post-Booker world. It does so by 
supplementing the current system instead of replacing it and by delving 
deeply into the sentencing data the Commission collects to demonstrate 
how that data can be used to craft a remedy for inter-judge disparity. 
In particular, this Article establishes that direct methods of 
attacking inter-judge disparity invariably produce unwarranted 
uniformity, which creates its own inequities. This was the approach taken 
by the mandatory guidelines. A more indirect approach that focuses on 
discrete, specific instances of inter-judge disparity should be tried 
instead.20 Federal appeals courts currently review sentences under a 
highly deferential, abuse-of-discretion standard. Congress should alter 
this standard by creating a presumption for federal appellate courts that 
a sentence is unreasonable if it deviates too much from what similarly 
situated offenders have received. Creating that presumption would (1) 
induce sentencing judges to provide greater justifications for their 
sentences in an attempt to overcome a presumption of unreasonableness 
and (2) make sentencing judges more aware of the sentences imposed by 
other judges on their courts, an awareness that is currently lacking.21 
These two predominant effects would ameliorate system-wide  
inter-judge disparity. 
Because this reform depends on measuring the distance a sentence 
deviates from those sentences typically issued to similarly situated 
offenders, this reform can work only if a feasible method exists for 
defining categories of similarly situated offenders. Fortunately, those 
categories can readily be defined by using the voluminous sentencing 
 17. E.g., William K. Sessions III, At the Crossroads of the Three Branches: The U.S. Sentencing 
Commission’s Attempts to Achieve Sentencing Reform in the Midst of Inter-Branch Power Struggles, 
26 J.L. & POL. 305, 309 (2011) (arguing that Congress should reformulate and simplify the sentencing 
guidelines). 
 18. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES JANUARY 
2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 tbl.19 (2010), http://www.ussc.gov/research-and-publications/ 
research-projects-and-surveys (reporting that more than three-quarters of judges believe the advisory 
system “‘best achieves’ the sentencing goals outlined in the U.S. Code, 18 U.S.C. § 3553, and only three 
percent of judges believe the mandatory Guidelines were better.”). 
 19. Alexander Bunin, Reducing Sentencing Disparity by Increasing Judicial Discretion, 22 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 81, 82 (2009). 
 20. For reasons explained below, this reform is best initiated through Congress, not courts. 
 21. Kopf, supra note 2, at 50. 
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data the U.S. Sentencing Commission already collects and publishes.22 
This data, combined with modern technology, permits this proposal to 
move forward in a way unfathomable when Congress passed the 
Sentencing Reform Act in 1984. Through computers and sentencing data, 
courts can readily construct categories of similarly situated offenders and 
calculate the ranges of sentences issued in each of those categories. 
Other articles have correctly identified the main problem in the 
post-Booker worlda lack of meaningful appellate reviewbut none has 
constructed the contours of an appellate solution or established why an 
appellate solution is feasible. This proposal fills that gap, and this Article 
also defends the constitutionality of increasing appellate review. Booker 
struck down stronger appellate review when Booker rendered the 
Guidelines advisory,23 and several scholars believe that increasing 
appellate review might unconstitutionally violate the remedial holding of 
Booker.24 This Article explains why changing appellate review is feasible 
and constitutional. Finally, the literature has not yet addressed  
inter-judge disparity that occurs within guideline ranges. Within-range 
sentences occur overwhelmingly at the bottom of each range96.6% of 
judges sentenced at the bottom of the range in the pre-Booker 
erameaning that a judge who deviates from the norm operates as a 













 22. 28 U.S.C. § 994(w) (2012). 
 23. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005). 
 24. E.g., Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1721–29, 1731–36 
(2012) (arguing that there are constitutional issues with Congress legislatively creating a presumption 
of reasonableness); Carissa Byrne Hessick, A Critical View of the Sentencing Commission’s Recent 
Recommendations to Strengthen the Guidelines System, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1335, 1359 (2014) 
(explaining Booker as striking a balance between district court discretion and fealty to the Guidelines, 
which creates “a real possibility that the Court might determine that [appellate review] proposals, if 
adopted, alter the Booker remedy to such an extent that it no longer fixes the Sixth Amendment 
problem”). 
 25. Of 911 judges who sentenced at least 10 defendants between 1999 and 2001, sentencing at the 
bottom of the guideline range was the standard practice for the vast majority of judges, 880 of them. 
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 4, at 109. 
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Figure 126 shows the distribution of sentences issued to defendants 
in the District of Nebraska who bear the same major offender 
characteristics: statutory sentencing guideline, guideline range (seventy 
to eighty-seven months), criminal history, acceptance of responsibility, 
and whether a defendant was subject to and sentenced to a mandatory 
minimum.27 This figure shows the dominant practice of sentencing 
offenders toward the bottom of a guideline range (seventy months in this 
example). The literature has failed to ask whether the offender who was 
sentenced to eighty-four months experienced inter-judge disparity 
despite being sentenced within the guideline range. This Article creates a 
system of appellate review that can readily address that question. 
In Part I, this Article describes the genesis of the Guidelines. It 
briefly explains Booker and the Supreme Court’s relevant subsequent 
decisions before exploring the studies that show a substantial increase in 
post-Booker inter-judge disparity. In Part II, this Article explains the 
proposal in more detail and suggests a statutory change that would lend 
effect to the proposal. In Part III, this Article discusses both the expected 
results of this reform on inter-judge disparity and the limits of the 
proposal. In doing so, it contrasts this proposal with others and shows 
that this reform is more capable of reducing inter-judge disparity. 
 26. To reduce the complexity of the horizontal axis, this Article classifies the data into fewer 
variables. The bin labeled “70,” for example, represents all defendants who received sentences greater 
than sixty-eight months and less than or equal to seventy months. All defendants listed here received 
seventy-month sentences. 
 27. Because the Guidelines instruct judges to disregard mandatory minimums where an offender 
has substantially assisted the prosecution or is eligible for a safety valve, this Article analyzes all 
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Additionally, this Article undertakes the critical task of showing that the 
reform is constitutional (because the reform operates outside the 
structure of the Guidelines) and that other reforms may not be. 
Part IV explains the methodology for how the data the Commission 
collects can be used (1) to create categories of similarly situated offenders 
and (2) to discern what sentences were issued to those offenders. This 
proposal can work only under a relatively simple formula for defining 
categories rather than the more complicated formula another author has 
proposed for a different but related purpose.28 Part V establishes how this 
method of selecting similarly situated offenders works and provides 
several examples that display the distribution of sentences among 
different offenders. 
I.  CURRENT STATE OF SENTENCING 
A proper understanding of current sentencing policy is incomplete 
without a general understanding of its historical developments.29 
A. BOOKER’S HISTORY 
1.   Booker’s Genesis 
In early colonial history, juries ordinarily made sentencing 
decisions, in part because penitentiaries were not yet common. Without 
prisons, convictions were usually linked with one specific sentence—
often death—so no rigorous sentencing mechanism was needed.30 Once 
penitentiaries became more common, federal law frequently provided 
fixed statutory sentences31 but also defined open ranges in which judges 
could sentence.32 The pre-defined ranges were indeterminatethat is, 
judges had full discretion to sentence within each rangeand federal law 
provided for virtually no appellate review, which was unusual among 
common law countries.33 The lack of appellate review made developing 
federal common law on sentencing issues almost impossible.34 
In the twentieth century, sentencing philosophy changed and 
altered with it the structure of sentencing policy. Early sentencing 
philosophy was largely retributive.35 By the middle of the twentieth 
 28. See discussion infra Part III.A.3. 
 29. For an extended analysis of this history, see STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 9–77; Nancy 
Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too Much Law, or Just Right, 100 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 692–97 (2010). 
 30. Gertner, supra note 29, at 694. 
 31. Note, The Admissibility of Character Evidence in Determining Sentence, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 715 
(1942). 
 32. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000). 
 33. Gertner, supra note 29, at 695–96. 
 34. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 23. 
 35. Gertner, supra note 29, at 694. 
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century, rehabilitative philosophies dominated. Necessary to those 
philosophies was broad discretion for judges.36 But rehabilitation soon 
gave way to rationalism and scientific rigor.37 The ideal of uniformity 
arrived,38 and with it judicial discretion became less necessary.39 A 
system based on rehabilitation required the careful judgment of judicial 
actors. In contrast, a scientifically rigorous algorithmic system was 
naturally more retributive and made Congress and the public the 
experts.40 
One example that exhibits the newer paradigm of scientific rigor is 
the American Law Institute’s attempt to “rationaliz[e] reforms in the area 
of crime definition” by instituting the Model Penal Code.41 At the time, 
the Supreme Court was busy fundamentally reshaping criminal 
procedure but was doing so only at the adjudication stage, leaving 
sentencing largely untouched.42 The Model Penal Code made sentencing 
appear anti-scientific and non-rigorous in comparison43 and invited 
criticisms against the sentencing system, which many viewed as 
dependent on the whims of judges and parole authorities.44 
During the push for the Sentencing Reform Act, scholars argued that 
sentence variation was partly explained by the temperaments of 
individual judges and sensitive defendant characteristics, such as race, 
education, and class.45 This culminated into a virtual crisis when Marvin 
Frankel, then a judge on the Southern District of New York and the 
“father of sentencing reform,”46 created a questionnaire of hypothetical 
cases. The questionnaire was mailed to federal judges in the Second 
Circuit. The results evinced a “glaring disparity” in sentencing practices 
on identical cases.47 In eighty percent of the hypothetical cases, judges 
 36. United States v. Mueffelman, 327 F. Supp. 2d 79, 83 (D. Mass. 2004) (Gertner, J.) (describing 
historical sentencing practices and declaring the judge’s role in rehabilitative sentencing as “almost 
like a doctor or social worker exercising clinical judgment”). 
 37. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 11–13, 23. 
 38. Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 749, 751 (2006). 
 39. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 28–30. 
 40. Gertner, supra note 29, at 691. 
 41. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 29–30. 
 42. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 252 (1949) (rejecting the argument that a judge’s 
consideration of a pre-sentence report, consisting of information provided by witnesses not available 
for cross-examination, violated the defendant’s due process rights). 
 43. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 29–30. 
 44. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 21; see also MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: 
LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1973); Anderson, supra note 9, at 274 (regarding disparity as “that variation 
caused by the identity” of specific judges). See generally KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY 
JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1976) (arguing that the greatest and most frequent injustice 
regarding sentencing occurs when judges are afforded broad discretion). 
 45. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 31. 
 46. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 35. 
 47. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 31. 
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disagreed on whether incarceration was even appropriate; in one 
hypothetical extortion case, the most lenient judge would have applied 
only a three-year sentence compared to the twenty-year sentence a 
harsher judge would have applied.48 
The desire to rationalize sentencing and make it scientifically 
rigorous finally led to the Sentencing Reform Act.49 Only a single voter in 
the Senate rejected the bill.50 But by that time, the Act had morphed into 
a tool bent on creating utopia. Senator Ted Kennedy, one of the principle 
architects, had first tried to create advisory Guidelines,51 but the Act as 
passed instead sought to reduce inter-judge disparity through brute force 
by (1) limiting judges to sentences within the calculated guideline range 
for each specific offender and (2) granting appellate courts broad 
appellate review.52 A sentence outside the calculated guideline range was 
to be reversed except under a few situations where departure was 
authorized.53 Congress further ramped up enforcement of the Guidelines 
in 2003in apparent reaction to higher-than-acceptable departure 
ratesby creating de novo appellate review for certain circumstances.54 
Originally intended to apply to all unenumerated downward 
departures,55 the 2003 statute ultimately made departing harder only in 
crimes involving pornography, sexual abuse, sexual activity with minors, 
and child kidnapping and trafficking.56 The Act turned a process that had 
been intended to be more acceptable to offenders into one designed to 
discourage crime and encourage cooperation between defendants and 
prosecutors in the name of uniformity.57 This model, centered on an ideal 
of uniformity, was largely rejected by the states.58 
 48. ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, FED. JUD. CTR., THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
SENTENCING STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT 6–7 (1974). 
 49. See O’Hear, supra note 38, at 751 (“[C]ritics argued in the 1970s that rehabilitation was an 
uncertain concept that might be misused as cover for irrational and inhumane practices.”). 
 50. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 43. 
 51. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 41 n.21. 
 52. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (2012). 
 53. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(2) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (permitting departure if the court finds that 
there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance “of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken 
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in 
a sentence different from that described”). 
 54. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21 § 401(d)(2), 117 Stat. 650, 667–68 (2003) (amending  
18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) to grant appellate courts de novo review over “the district court’s application of the 
guidelines to the facts”). 
 55. H. Amend. 19 to H.R. 1104, 108th Cong. (2003) (Rep. Feeney). 
 56. PROTECT Act § 401(a), (b) (permitting only those departures listed in United States 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5H, not those departures recognized solely in United States 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K). 
 57. O’Hear, supra note 38, at 816. 
 58. O’Hear, supra note 38, at 816. 
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The Act created the Sentencing Commission59 and required it to 
draft a comprehensive, binding60 sentencing code that controlled 
essentially all significant sentencing decisions.61 Congress directed the 
Commission to create a rigorous and comprehensive system that would 
“reflect every important factor relevant to sentencing for each category of 
offense and each category of offender, give appropriate weight to each 
factor, and deal with various combinations of factors.”62 In addition to 
the comprehensive system of sentencing, the Commission included 
“commentaries” and “policy statements” that delineated the purpose of 
the Guidelines. The Court later interpreted these statements to be as 
authoritative as the Guidelines themselves.63 
The desire to introduce scientific rigor into sentencing certainly 
found its imprint on the Act. As written, the Act requires judges to follow 
a lengthy process of discerning (by a preponderance of the evidence) 
whether any number of voluminous adjustments applies to an offender.64 
A judge first determines which Guidelines category covers the offender 
before applying numerous “specific offense characteristics” to calculate a 
“base offense level” score.65 This process “reflects the Commission’s 
determination to minimize the need for sentencing judges to exercise 
their judgment.”66 The task is frequently difficult. Categories often  
cross-reference each other,67 and a judge may have to compute multiple 
calculations. After the base offense level is determined, the judge adjusts 
the level based on enhancements that exist for an offender’s role in the 
crime, the vulnerability of the victim, etc. The judge then calculates the 
offender’s criminal history. 
 59. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2012). Initially, only one member of the Commission had ever been 
involved in sentencing. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 49. 
 60. Judges were prohibited from departing from the calculated guideline ranges except in rare, 
exceptional circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2012) (excised in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 
220, 220 (2005)); United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K1.1; id. at § 5K2.0. 
 61. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2012). The Act also abolished parole. Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The 
Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,  
28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 226–42 (1993) (examining the abolition of parole and the many 
proposed, but never enacted, statutory provisions that would have kept some indeterminate parole). 
Parole had been in place at least since 1910. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, 36 Stat. 819, 819.  
 62. S. REP. NO. 225, 98-225, at 166 (1983). 
 63. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 41–47 (1993) (holding commentary statements to be 
authoritative); Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 201 (1992) (holding policy statements to be 
authoritative). 
 64. Among many others, these include whether a gun was possessed or fired, the amount of fiscal 
loss, the quantity of drugs, whether a burgled building was a residence, and whether any bodily injury 
occurred. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
 65. Id. at ch. 2, introductory cmt. 
 66. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 68. 
 67. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL § 1B1.5 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015); e.g., id. 
§ 2K2.1 (felon-in-possession of firearms guideline, instructing the judge to apply section 2X1.1which 
covers attempts, solicitations, and conspiraciesif the possession was in connection with another 
offense and the resulting sentence is greater). 
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The judge then locates the intersection of the criminal history and 
offense level scores on the Commission’s matrix chart. Each intersection 
yields a narrow range, and the top of the range generally cannot exceed 
the bottom by more than twenty-five percent.68 Still not yet finished, the 
judge then takes into account several dozen Guidelines policy 
prescriptions that dictate whether the judge can depart from the 
calculated guideline range in narrow circumstances.69 
2.   Booker and Its Progeny 
This rigorous and binding system survived for eighteen years until 
United States v. Booker made the Guidelines effectively advisory. 
Decided at the apotheosis of the efforts by the Rehnquist Court to 
establish itself as “one of the most vigorous protectors of the jury 
guarantee in Supreme Court history,”70 the Court reasoned that a Sixth 
Amendment violation occurs when a maximum sentence is increased 
based on facts proved only by preponderance to a judge instead of beyond 
a reasonable doubt to a jury.71 The Court also held later that elements 
that increase the minimum sentence a court can impose must also be 
proved before a jury.72 
In fashioning a remedy, the Court could have simply required 
prosecutors to present those elements to a jury.73 Instead, the Court, in 
an attempt to divine Congressional intent, excised two provisions from 
the Act.74 The first had required de novo review. The Court found that the 
Act, in the light of the Court’s constitutional holding, implied a substitute 
standard of “reasonableness” review.75 The second provision had made 
the Guidelines mandatory. Excising that provision the Court “ma[de] the 
Guidelines effectively advisory,”76 requiring judges to both consider 
whether a sentence was reasonable in the light of the statutory factors 
Congress had identified as relevant to sentencing and to calculate and 
 68. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (2012); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, 2 (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).  
 69. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, 6–7 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).  
 70. Rachel E. Barkow, Originalists, Politics, and Criminal Law on the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1043, 1044 (2006).  
 71. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 232 (2005). Because the Guidelines were mandatory 
before Booker, the district court was statutorily limited to imposing a sentence within the 210-262 
month calculated range based on what the jury had found (minus certain statutory exceptions not 
applicable). Id. at 227. But the district court exercised judicial fact-finding to increase the offender’s 
sentencing range to 360 months to life. Id.  
 72. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2162–63 (2013). 
 73. See, e.g., Booker, 543 U.S. at 325 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part). 
 74. Id. at 227, 246 (“We seek to determine what ‘Congress would have intended’ in light of the 
Court’s constitutional holding”). 
 75. Id. at 261. 
 76. Id. at 245. 
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consider the Guidelines before sentencing a defendant.77 Calculating the 
Guidelines is important because “in the ordinary case, the Commission’s 
recommendation of a sentencing range will ‘reflect a rough 
approximation of sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives.’”78 
Booker quickly became a subject of both scholarly and judicial 
interest. One of the most cited Supreme Court cases,79 Booker also 
spawned a lengthy doctrine.80 Most importantly, the Court expounded 
on its promulgation of reasonableness review shortly after Booker.81 The 
Court highlighted the close relationship between the Guidelines and the 
§ 3553(a) statutory sentencing factors. Section 3553(a) outlines a list of 
 77. Id. (invoking 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). 
 78. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 
338, 350 (2007)). 
 79. Courts have cited Booker more than 30,000 times compared to the just over 15,000 citations 
to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) according to citations 
recognized in the Westlaw database as of November 2017 (last visited Mar. 3, 2018). 
 80. As of 2017, the Court has heard a number of cases expanding on or related to Booker. Beckles 
v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 894 (2017) (holding that the Guidelines are not subject to challenges 
under the void-for-vagueness doctrine because “they merely guide the exercise of a court’s 
discretion”); Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1348–49 (2016) (holding that a 
defendant need not establish that unpreserved error affected the defendant’s substantial rights); 
Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2162–63 (2013) (holding that any fact increasing the 
mandatory minimum is an “element” required to be submitted to a jury); Peugh v. United States, 133 
S. Ct. 2072, 2081, 2088 (2013) (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits sentencing offenders 
under Guidelines promulgated after an offender has committed a crime when the newer Guidelines 
provides a higher sentencing range, despite the Guidelines being advisory); S. Union Co. v. United 
States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2350, 2357 (2012) (applying Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), 
the Apprendi rule, to courts issuing criminal fines); Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 504–05 
(2011) (permitting district courts to consider post-sentencing rehabilitation during re-sentencing after 
an offender’s sentence has been vacated); United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218, 224, 235 
(2010) (requiring the status of a firearm as a machinegun to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to 
a jury, not to be included as a sentencing factor to be proved to a judge); Dillon v. United States, 560 
U.S. 817, 819, 828–30 (2010) (holding that the Guidelines are mandatory under an 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(2) resentencing proceeding when the Guidelines have been altered in favor of the 
offender); Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 262, 265–66 (2009) (“clarify[ing] that district courts 
are entitled to reject and vary categorically from the crack cocaine Guidelines based on a policy 
disagreement” alone after Kimbrough); Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 168 (2009) (permitting states to 
assign to judges finding of facts regarding whether a consecutive sentence for multiple offenses should 
be imposed); Moore v. United States, 555 U.S. 1, 3–4 (2008) (vacating a sentence where the judge 
believed the judge had no discretion to reject the crack-powder ratio); Greenlaw v. United States, 554 
U.S. 237, 243–44 (2008) (prohibiting courts of appeals from increasing an offender’s sentence absent 
a federal government appeal or cross-appeal); Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 712–13, 716 
(2008) (holding that FED R. CRIM. P. 32(h), requiring notice when a court is considering a  
non-Guidelines sentence, does not apply for a regular sentence variance from the recommended 
guideline range); Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 91 (permitting courts to depart from the Guidelines’ 100-to-
1 crack-powder ratio disparity); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007) (requiring courts of 
appeals to review all federal criminal sentences under a deferential abuse-of-discretion 
standard); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 341 (2007) (permitting courts of appeals to apply a 
presumption of reasonableness to a district court sentence within the recommended guideline 
range); Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 275 (2007) (striking down California’s 
determinate sentencing law as violating Booker). 
 81. See, e.g., Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 91; Gall, 552 U.S. at 41; Rita, 551 U.S. at 341.  
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“Factors to be Considered [by a District Court Judge] in Imposing a 
Sentence” and includes, for example, considering what sentence is 
needed “to afford adequate deterrence” and “to avoid unwarranted 
sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have 
been found guilty of similar conduct.”82 The Court held that appellate 
courts may adopt a rebuttable presumption that within-Guidelines 
sentences are reasonable.83 The whole purpose of the Guidelines was to 
“seek to embody the § 3553(a) considerations.”84 As such, the guideline 
ranges “reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve 
§ 3553(a)’s objectives.”85 A presumption of reasonableness recognizes 
that both the Commission and the district court have arrived at the same 
conclusion.86 
Although district courts cannot presume sentences to be reasonable, 
the Court said that within-range sentences ordinarily need no 
explanation other than a statement that the court is following the 
Guidelines rationale but that greater explanations are often necessary the 
further a sentence deviates from the calculated range.87 (This statement 
ignored the potential problem of inter-judge disparity within a guideline 
range.) Yet the Court later prohibited any type of “rigid mathematical 
formula” from determining the strength of the justification that should 
be required for departures.88 Using a mathematical formula would “come 
too close to creating an impermissible presumption of unreasonableness” 
for non-Guidelines sentences.89 The worry appears to be that a 
presumption of unreasonableness could reintroduce the Sixth 
Amendment problem by making the Guidelines effectively mandatory.90 
The Court explicitly declared that a heightened appellate standard “is 
inconsistent with” Booker’s abuse of discretion standard,91 although 
courts can “consider the extent of a deviation from the Guidelines” when 
determining whether a sentence is reasonable.92 
Not yet done with disarming appellate review after Booker, the 
Court showed just how broad district court discretion is when it decided 
Kimbrough v. United States. There, the Court permitted district court 
 82. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), (a)(2)(B), (a)(6) (2012). 
 83. Rita, 551 U.S. at 347. 
 84. Id. at 350. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. at 347. 
 87. Id. at 356–57. 
 88. Gall v. United States, 551 U.S. 38, 47 (2007). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Brief for United States at 34–35, Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (No. 06-5754) 
(implying that a presumption of unreasonableness might be problematic because it might “transform 
an ‘effectively advisory’ system . . . into an effectively mandatory one” (quoting United States v. 
Moreland, 437 F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 2006)).) 
 91. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49. 
 92. Id. at 50. 
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judges to vary downward based solely on a policy disagreement the 
district court judge had with the 100-to-1 crack-powder ratio outlined in 
the Guidelines.93 The Court extended this holding in Spears v. United 
States, when it affirmed a district court’s decision not only to disagree 
with the Guidelines ratio but to create its own.94 
B. BOOKER’S PROBLEMS 
The return of judicial discretion established by Booker has generally 
been welcomed95 (although more than a few find the case 
objectionable96). The mandatory system was too constraining in its 
utopian pursuit of an algorithm that could be used to sentence unique 
offenders. It had reacted to the tendency the indeterminate sentencing 
framework had of focusing “too much on individualization and not 
enough on avoiding unjust disparities.”97 But it weighed too heavily drug 
quantities and how much financial loss a crime involved and left little 
room for judges to provide feedback to the Commission through their 
sentencing.98 
But in bringing back wide judicial discretion, the Court also 
destroyed any sense of meaningful appellate review. Not only is the 
reasonableness review of Booker a highly unusual standard for reviewing 
district court decisions,99 but the Court promoted judicial discretion by 
removing the central functions of ordinary appellate review. For 
instance, the presumption of reasonableness in Rita v. United States 
diverges from ordinary standards of review because it is an optional 
presumption that appellate courts may make, and Kimbrough, by 
requiring reasonableness review for policy disagreements with the 
Guidelines, departs from the ordinary norm that legal determinations of 
district courts are reviewed de novo.100 The Court has essentially created 
a safe harbor for within-range sentences, Rita; has prohibited courts 
from rigorously defining proportional justification requirements for 
departures, Gall v. United States; and has permitted virtually limitless 
discretion based solely on judicial philosophy, Kimbrough/Spears. 
 93. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109–10 (2007).  
 94. Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 267 (2009). 
 95. E.g., Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 24, at 1632–33. 
 96. E.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, Nothing Is Not Enough: Fix the Absurd Post-Booker Federal 
Sentencing System, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 356, 356 (2012) (criticizing the post-Booker system as 
“retain[ing] most of the flaws of the system it replaced, while adding new ones”). 
 97. Rachel E. Barkow, Sentencing Guidelines at the Crossroads of Politics and Expertise, 160  
U. PENN. L. REV. 1599, 1619 (2012). 
 98. Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 24, at 1675, 1706–07. 
 99. Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Decisions,  
60 ALA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2008). 
 100. Id. at 19, 25. 
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This last point is especially important. Although the Kimbrough 
Court placed heavy emphasis on facts that were particular to 
Kimbroughthat the crack-powder ratio existed because of 
congressional inertia and despite the Commission’s public proclamation 
that the ratio should be changed101the Court later emphasized that 
sentencing judges are afforded “wide discretion” and may disregard 
Guidelines policies in other areas, such as when a judge considers post-
sentencing rehabilitative conduct during resentencing.102 The Court has 
even permitted sentencing courts to not just disregard policy statements, 
but to substitute into the Guidelines their own policy statementsat 
least with regard to crack-powder ratios103and courts have read this 
holding as a grant of authority of vast judicial discretion to disregard 
Guidelines policy statements.104 Finally, although Kimbrough hinted 
 101. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 99, 109 (2007); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY viii (2002) (“[T]he 
Commission . . . unanimously and firmly concludes that the various congressional objectives can be 
achieved more effectively by decreasing substantially the 100-to-1 drug quantity ratio.”). The 
Commission had passed an amendment to equalize the crack/powder penalties, but President Clinton 
signed legislation nullifying the amendment. Id. at v.  
 102. Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 480, 500–01 (2011) (quoting Williams v. New York, 
337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)). The Guidelines explicitly prohibited consideration of post-sentencing 
rehabilitation during resentencing. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.19 (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2010). But the Court declared that sentencing courts must only “give ‘respectful 
consideration’” to policy statements, a sharp post-Booker departure from its original holding that such 
policy statements were authoritative. Pepper, 562 U.S. at 501 (quoting Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 101); 
cf. Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 201 (1992) (holding policy statements to be authoritative). 
 103. Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 265–66 (2009). 
 104. See, e.g., United States v. Henderson, 649 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir. 2011) (permitting a 
downward variance because of a policy disagreement with the child pornography Guidelines); United 
States v. Grober, 624 F.3d 592, 608–09 (3d Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174, 
188 (2d Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d 568, 584–85 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(interpreting Kimbrough as declaring “the broad authority of sentencing judges” to “categorically 
reject” a calculated sentencing range); see also Clare Freeman, Spears v. U.S.Getting the Kimbrough 
Point Across, SIXTH CIRCUIT BLOG (Jan. 22, 2009, 9:02 AM), http://circuit6.blogspot.com/ 
2009/01/spears-v-us-getting-kimbrough-point.html. But see United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 
1201 n.15 (11th Cir. 2008) (rejecting a downward variance for disagreements with the child 
pornography Guidelines). 
  This reading of Kimbrough is internally coherent with Booker’s creation of an advisory system 
and is the better reading after Spears and Pepper. Yet one can plausibly read Kimbrough more 
narrowly in the light of its emphasis on the history of the crack-powder ratio and the legislative inertia 
that had, at the time, prevented the Commission from crafting a new issuing. See Kimbrough v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 85, 94–100 (2007). In Pepper, too, the Court permitted disregarding the Guidelines 
policy statements in part because the Court found the statement to be “wholly unconvincing.” Pepper, 
562 U.S. at 501. 
  Judge Hardiman, who sits on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, argues that the 
Kimbrough line should not be interpreted to allow judges to vary from the Guidelines based on policy 
disagreements alone. Hon. Thomas M. Hardiman & Richard L. Heppner Jr., Policy Disagreements 
with the United States Sentencing Guidelines: A Welcome Expansion of Judicial Discretion or the 
Beginning of the End of the Sentencing Guidelines?, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 5, 32–33 (2012). Hardiman 
instead counsels that, before varying, district court judges should consider whether the Guidelines 
reflect the Commission acting in its archetypal institutional role and whether the advisory sentencing 
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that “closer review” might be appropriate for certain policy 
disagreements,105 the Court left open whether closer review is ever 
appropriate.106 The weight of the doctrine leaves little to the imagination; 
sentencing judges enjoy broad discretion. 
Furthermore, reasonableness review nominally permits courts to 
vacate sentences as substantively unreasonable, but the extremely 
deferential standard of review the Court has promulgated has ensured 
that sentences are almost never vacated for this reason.107 Many of the 
sentences that are vacated as substantively unreasonable might also be 
mislabeled, overstating the actual number. Errors some circuits have 
held were substantive errors are considered by other circuits to be 
procedural errors.108 
What’s more, procedural error review hardly constrains a judge’s 
substantive decisions because a judge is largely free to issue to an 
offender the same sentence on remand. Procedural reasonableness has 
been interpreted to require only that a district judge show that he or she 
has correctly calculated the applicable guideline range, has not treated 
the Guidelines as mandatory, has considered the § 3553(a) factors, and 
has not relied on clearly erroneous facts.109 Yet after calculating a 
guideline range, a judge is fully permitted to disregard the Guidelines. 
These rules establish a system of wide judicial discretion with 
limited appellate oversight, which was the major problem with 
range is reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors. Id. 
 105. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109. 
 106. Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2080 n.2 (2013). 
 107. Courts of appeals ordinarily reverse barely one percent of sentences that are challenged as 
substantively unreasonable. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS tbl.59 (2012), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/ 
annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2011/Table59_0.pdf [hereinafter 2011 SOURCEBOOK]; U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.59 (2013), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-source 
books/2012/Table59_0.pdf [hereinafter 2012 SOURCEBOOK]; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2013 
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.59 (2014), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/ 
files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2013/Table59.pdf. 
[hereinafter 2013 SOURCEBOOK]; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2014 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS tbl.59 (2015), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/ 
annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2014/Table59.pdf [hereinafter 2014 SOURCEBOOK]. 
 108. For instance, the Sixth Circuit considers it to be substantively unreasonable when a court 
considers impermissible factors. See United States v. Ward, 506 F.3d 468, 478 (6th Cir. 2007). While 
Ward has been favorably cited elsewhere, United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1192 (11th Cir. 2008), 
impermissible-factors cases are largely relegated to the Sixth Circuit. That is probably because Gall 
suggests that considering impermissible factors is procedural error, not substantive error. Gall held 
that procedural unreasonableness includes failing to consider each of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. 
Gall, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). This holding implies a negative component that the § 3553(a) factors are 
exhaustive and that courts should not consider other factors. 
  The Sixth Circuit also categorizes as substantively unreasonable a court’s failure to adequately 
justify a sentence. See United States v. Borho, 485 F.3d 904, 911 (6th Cir. 2007). But Gall explicitly 
considers this failure under the umbrella of procedural unreasonableness. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 
 109. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 
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indeterminate sentencing before the Sentencing Reform Act.110 Current 
doctrine now resembles a bifurcated system. The Supreme Court, 
concerned with the arbitrary imposition of death sentences, has used the 
appellate process to create greater safeguards in capital cases, but 
concern at the appellate stage with arbitrary results induced by  
inter-judge disparity in non-capital cases is lacking.111 
This reduction in meaningful appellate review appears to have been 
the primary driver of increases in inter-judge disparity. Booker’s return 
of judicial discretion certainly had an effect, but the brunt of the increase 
did not occur until after Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough.112 The needed 
destruction of uniformity, coupled with the decimation of meaningful 
appellate review, has created a system in which virtually no parts are 
oriented toward reducing inter-judge disparity. The only aspects that do 
still limit inter-judge disparity are the anchoring effects of the Guidelines 
and judicial inertia.113 After Booker, some feared that judges would issue 
radically disparate sentences.114 After all, sentencing lengths 
tremendously increased (and non-incarceration rates significantly 
decreased) after the Sentencing Reform Act and the Guidelines.115 But the 
decrease since Booker, while measurable, has been far from severe. The 
mean and median sentences decreased by three to six months and may 
be on the rise again.116 
 110. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 82 (identifying the lack of appellate review as one of the 
greatest deficiencies of the indeterminate era). 
 111. See Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional 
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1148, 1204 (2009) (stating that 
non-capital defendants receive “almost no Court oversight of their sentences,” which “languish in a 
backwater devoid of any procedural protections”). 
 112. Crystal S. Yang, Have Interjudge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory Guidelines 
Regime? Evidence from Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268, 1333 (2014). 
 113. The Court has implicitly recognized this effect. E.g., Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 
2081, 2088 (2013) (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits sentencing offenders under 
advisory Guidelines promulgated after an offender has committed a crime when the newer Guidelines 
provides a higher sentencing range). 
  The effect is also well-documented in scholarship. Birte Englich, et al., Playing Dice with 
Criminal Sentences: The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on Experts’ Judicial Decision Making,  
32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 188, 194 (2006) (suggesting that giving judges starting values, 
even ones known to be arbitrary, has a discernible anchoring effect on judicial sentencing); Amos 
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 
1128–30 (1974) (demonstrating this psychological bias in non-judicial realms); see also, e.g., Nancy 
Gertner, Thoughts on Reasonableness, 19 FED. SENT’G REP. 165, 167 (2007) (recognizing the effect); 
Stephanos Bibas et al., Policing Politics at Sentencing, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1371, 1387 (2009) (same); 
Michael M. O’Hear, Appellate Review of Sentence Explanations: Learning from the Wisconsin and 
Federal Experiences, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 758 (2009) (same). 
 114. Carl Hulse & Adam Liptak, New Fight over Controlling Punishments Is Widely Seen, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at A29 (identifying some commentators as calling Booker an “egregious 
overreach” and saying it will lead to “wildly inconsistent” outcomes while others praise the decision 
for allowing greater leniency). 
 115. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 5–6. 
 116. Bowman, supra note 10, at 1236. 
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But even inertia and anchoring effects are unlikely to stem the flow 
of inter-judge disparity. The relative stability of sentences is true only in 
the aggregate, not across the board. The means and medians are level, 
but only because firearm and economic sentences increased significantly 
to counter the decrease in drug and immigration sentences.117 And the 
aggregate means and medians mask the variation between judges. So, 
too, mandatory minimums cloud the data by making median sentences 
appear more uniform, disguising the true effect of Booker by mixing into 
the same pot sentences where judges are statutorily constrained and 
sentences where judges are free to disregard the Guidelines.118 Most 
notably, even with a high adherence to the Guidelines, geographic 
disparity and inter-judge disparity have increased measurably.119 Quite 
apart from the hard data, the anecdotal evidence has been 
tremendous.120 Professor Frank Bowman concludes that “uncontrolled 
disparity will again become a rallying cry” because inter-judge disparity 
“should matter to anyone who believes that one important component of 
a just system of criminal punishment is that similarly situated offenders 
are treated substantially similarly.”121 
Inertia and anchoring effects are also unlikely to stem the tide of 
inter-judge disparity because those effects are weaker on new judges. 
Immediately after Booker, nearly all judges were used to the mandatory 
Guidelines regime andquite apart from the anchoring effect of the 
Guidelinesmay have remained relatively inert in their sentencing 
practices.122 But by the end of his term, President Obama had appointed 
more than one-third of the district court bench.123 To the extent the 
inertia hypothesis is correct, inter-judge disparity should increase as  
 117. Bowman, supra note 10, at 1241. 
 118. Bowman, supra note 10, at 1257. 
 119. Bowman, supra note 10, at 1261. 
 120. Scott, supra note 5, at 3–4. 
 121. Bowman, supra note 10, at 1267–68. 
 122. Scott, supra note 5, at 5 (finding two judges in the District of Massachusetts to be relatively 
inert in their sentencing practices). However, Scott found that no greater inertia effect occurred for 
judges who were appointed after 1987 than those appointed before; both sentenced below the 
Guidelines more than thirty percent of the time in the post-Booker era. Scott, supra note 5, at 43–44.  
  These findings do not necessarily counter the conjecture that newly appointed judges will 
abide by the Guidelines less. Scott’s hypothesis is that judges appointed before 1987 “might cast off 
the yoke of the Guidelines more readily.” Scott, supra note 5, at 43. But even if a judge had enjoyed 
greater sentencing freedom before 1987, by the time Booker was decided, the judge would have been 
sentencing under a mandatory regime for nearly two decades. The difference between a pre-1987 judge 
and a post-1987 (but pre-Booker) judge is not terribly meaningful. But the difference between a  
pre-Booker judge and a post-Booker judge is tremendous. One should not expect a pre-1987 judge to 
sentence much differently from a judge appointed in, say, 1999. But one should expect that both will 
sentence very differently from a judge who never sentenced under a mandatory regime.  
 123. Judgeship Appointments by President, U.S. CTS. http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-
judgeships/authorized-judgeships/judgeship-appointments-president (last visited Mar. 3, 2018). 
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pre-Booker judges retire and are replaced by post-Booker judges.124 If 
one cares about inter-judge disparity, the time for action is yesterday. A 
more meaningful form of appellate review is necessary. 
C. RECENT STUDIES DEMONSTRATING INTER-JUDGE DISPARITY 
Measuring inter-judge disparity has traditionally been notoriously 
difficult.125 The Commission gathers a wealth of data, compiling 
extensive information for almost all of the 70,000-plus defendants each 
year. This data includes the guidelines calculations, statutory offense 
category, and as many as thousands of other data points (depending on 
how the judge sentences the offender). The problem is the Commission 
removes all identifying information before publicly releasing the data, 
which makes measuring the differences in sentences by judges more 
difficult.126 Even where identifying information is available, studies have 
had difficulty controlling for relevant sentencing characteristics.127 
Several recent studies have nevertheless overcome these boundaries to 
show the increasing significance of inter-judge disparity. 
Professor Ryan Scott surveyed the data released by judges in the 
Boston division of the District of Massachusetts. The only district at the 
time to publicly release its data with judge identifiers,128 the district 
opened up a critical insight into a world before unknown. The results are 
 124. See Gertner, supra note 16, at 270 (identifying adherence to the Guidelines post-Booker as 
the result of “habits ingrained during twenty years of mandatory Guideline sentencing”); Yang, supra 
note 112, at 1319 (noting that as newer judges take the bench, the Guidelines are likely to have less of 
an anchoring effect). 
 125. Scott, supra note 5, at 21 (noting that “changes are almost impossible to detect”); Caleb Mason 
& David Bjerk, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity on the Federal Bench: An Examination of Drug 
Smuggling Cases in the Southern District of California, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 190, 190 (2013) 
(identifying as “principal shortcomings” of these measurements the difficulty in either identifying 
judges or controlling for “relevant offense-conduct facts”). 
 126. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, PUBLIC ACCESS TO SENTENCING COMMISSION DOCUMENTS AND DATA, 
54 Fed. Reg. 51279 (Dec. 13, 1989) (delineating an agreement between the Commission and the 
Judicial Conference to remove all judge and defendant identifiers from publicly released datafiles); 
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDE TO PUBLICATIONS & RESOURCES 2010/2011 28 (2010), (“Pursuant to 
the policy on public access to Sentencing Commission documents and data, all case and defendant 
identifiers have been removed from the data.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 127. E.g., Anderson et al., supra note 9, at 274 (employing a methodology that considered “solely 
that variation caused by the identity of the decision maker,” as opposed to variation in punishment 
among different classes of offenders); Paul J. Hofer et al., The Effect of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines on Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 239, 282 (1999) (“We 
recognize that this measures only the ‘tip of the iceberg’ of disparity created by judges, because it fails 
to account for interaction effects between judges and particular offense and offender characteristics.”); 
Joel Waldfogel, Aggregate Inter-Judge Disparity in Federal Sentencing: Evidence from Three 
Districts (D. Ct., S.D.N.Y., N.D. Cal.), 4 FED. SENT’G REP. 151, 151–52 (1991). But see Mason & Bjerk, 
supra note 125, at 191–92 (employing a methodology that allowed the researchers to limit the cases to 
offenders who had dealt in drug quantities triggering mandatory minimums but were eligible for the 
sentencing safety valve and received reduced sentences). 
 128. Scott, supra note 5, at 4. 
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striking. Limiting his analysis to 10 active-status judges who had 
sentenced at least 50 defendants,129 Scott found that the 3 most lenient 
judges impose sentences that average 25.5 months or less; the other 2 
judges impose sentences that average more than double (51.4 months) 
the more lenient judges. Not unsurprisingly, four judges now sentence 
below the guideline ranges at more than triple their pre-Booker rates.130 
Following the Boston Study, the District of Nebraska voted to release 
its sentencing data to the public.131 In Nebraska, sentences are more 
likely to be uniform because judges impose within-range sentences at 
rates much higher than the national average, yet one judge sentenced 
drug offenders at twice the median rate of a second. Although this effect 
might be overstated because the stricter judge had sentenced fewer drug 
offenders and had greater control over the docket because the judge had 
taken senior status, the difference in median rate between the two active 
judges with a comparable number of sentences was still twenty-two 
percent.132 
Researchers in a third study manually collected data by accessing 
complaints and dockets in the Southern District of California, allowing 
the researchers to identify the judges.133 But rather than look at average 
or median sentences, the researchers employed a new methodology. They 
recognized that offenders with somewhat disparate drug quantities can 
receive the same guideline range calculations. For instance, the drug 
quantity table assigns the same offense level to individuals who deal 
fifteen kilograms of cocaine as to those who deal forty-nine kilograms of 
cocaine,134 yet one would expect judges to sentence the latter somewhat 
more heavily. The researchers isolated their data so they were looking at 
offenders who differed only in type and quantity of drugs.135 This practice 
allowed them to use regression analysis to create an “expected” sentence 
for each drug quantity and to measure how far from the expected 
sentence each judge deviated.136 
The researchers found “substantial disparity.”137 Ten of thirteen 
judges had low variance from the expected sentence, but two judges were 
noticeably more lenient (sentencing around seventeen to eighteen 
 129. Scott, supra note 5, at 25. 
 130. Scott, supra note 5, at 4–5. 
 131. Kopf, supra note 2, at 50. 
 132. Kopf, supra note 2, at at 51 app. tbl. 7 (Drug Trafficking (2007–2011)).  
 133. Mason & Bjerk, supra note 125, at 191. 
 134. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c)(4) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).  
 135. The researchers ensured they were measuring similarly situated offenders by limiting their 
analysis to individuals who were given sentences below mandatory minimums despite carrying drug 
quantities that would trigger a mandatory minimum but for the offenders being eligible for a safety 
valve that prevented the mandatory minimum, a benefit available only to offenders with criminal 
history scores of one. Mason & Bjerk, supra note 125, at 191.  
 136. Mason & Bjerk, supra note 125, at 191–92. 
 137. Mason & Bjerk, supra note 125, at 196. 
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percent below the “expected” sentence) and one was noticeably harsher 
(sentencing around thirty percent above the “expected sentence”).138 
These differences “reflect individual judges’ preferences about the 
appropriate sentence for the same crime.”139 
Another study launched by the Transactional Records Access 
Clearinghouse (“TRAC”) program at Syracuse University140 acquired 
most of the sentencing data covering a five-year period: roughly 370,000 
cases nationwide.141 Because the Sentencing Commission does not 
voluntarily release data that identifies judges, TRAC gathered this data 
from other sources, such as the Office of Personnel Management142 and, 
evidently, PACER.143 Like Scott’s study, TRAC limited its data to judges 
who had sentenced at least fifty defendants, and TRAC subdivided the 
data into categories of judges who had served continuously during the 
five-year post-Booker span and for judges who had continuously served 
on active status during that time.144 
Although some of the districts maintained low variance, the results 
were largely consistent with all other studies. The median sentences of 
judges in Dallas, Texas, varied between 60 months and 121.5 months; in 
Fort Worth between 102.5 months and 160 months; and in the District 
of Columbia between 27 and 77 months.145 
The most crucial and developed study comes from Professor Crystal 
S. Yang, who built upon the work of the TRAC Report and Scott’s study. 
In merging the TRAC Report data with sentencing data the Commission 
makes available, Yang identified the sentencing judge for more than 
400,000 sentences, eliminating some of the most serious hindrances to 
studying inter-judge disparity.146 The most comprehensive study to date, 
Yang’s study found that the effect of inter-judge disparity doubled in the 
post-Booker period.147 
D. LIMITS OF THESE STUDIES 
These studies are not without their limits, and each included caveats 
about interpreting the findings too broadly.148 But each also shows 
 138. Mason & Bjerk, supra note 125, at 193, 195. 
 139. Mason & Bjerk, supra note 125, at 192. 
 140. Surprising Judge-to-Judge Variations Documented in Federal Sentencing, TRAC REP. (Mar. 
5, 2012), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/judge/274. 
 141. Susan B. Long & David Burnham, TRAC Report: Examining Current Federal Sentencing 
Practices: A National Study of Differences Among Judges, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 6, 6 (2012). 
 142. Id. at 7.  
 143. Hofer, supra note 8, at 37. 
 144. Long & Burnham, supra note 141, at 7. 
 145. Long & Burnham, supra note 141, at 9–10. 
 146. Yang, supra note 112, at 1275, 1296. 
 147. Yang, supra note 112, at 1275. 
 148. E.g., Yang, supra note 112, at 1292 (noting that “a single courthouse is likely unrepresentative 
of other courthouses across the United States”); Long & Burnham, supra note 141, at 15 (stating that 
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increases in inter-judge disparity, no study has shown an absence of an 
increase, and the sources of anecdotal evidence are tremendous.149 
The limits do not overcome these findings. The first major limit is 
that each of the studies assumes that cases are randomly assigned. 
Recent history indicates potentially significant problems (for the 
purposes of data collection) in the way cases are assigned.150 
Additionally, prosecutors are not necessarily assigned randomly, and 
they may tailor their conduct to the judges they draw. 
Second, each study limited itself to judges who had sentenced more 
than fifty defendants, but only the TRAC study further qualified its data 
by sentence type (although it considered forty sentences instead of 
fifty).151 On the surface, fifty seems like a reasonable 
numberintroductory statistics books often paint thirty as the magic 
number152but fifty may be too small if judges received skewed dockets. 
For instance, one judge may receive fifty randomly allotted sentencings 
that proportionately represent the standard docket of cases while 
another judge may receive a thirty-defendant drug trafficking case where 
many defendants are subject to mandatory minimums. Yet these 
sentencing patterns are most likely rare and would largely affect judges 
who had sentenced relatively few offenders. Many of the judges in the 
studies sentenced far more than fifty offenders. The Scott study also 
ameliorated this difficulty by looking at the difference between the 
sentence imposed and the sentence suggested by the calculated 
guidelines.153 
the large differences in median sentences “is not sufficient to establish that such differences are indeed 
unwarranted sentencing disparities”). 
 149. Scott, supra note 5, at 3–4. 
 150. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Federal Court Alters Rules on Judge 
Assignments, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 23, 2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/12/24/nyregion/federal-court-
alters-rules-on-judge-assignments.html (asserting that the litigation over the stop-and-frisk policy in 
New York City has exposed problems in supposed random assignment); Katherine A. Macfarlane, The 
Danger of Nonrandom Case Assignment: How the Southern District of New York’s “Related Cases” 
Rule Shaped Stop-and-Frisk Rulings, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 199, 203 (2014) (stating that one judge 
was randomly assigned a single case and then received all “related” cases); Joe Palazzolo, The Problem 
with Not-So-Random Case Assignment, WALL ST. J. (NOV. 4, 2013, 4:44 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/11/04/the-problem-with-not-so-random-case-assignment 
(discussing a congressionally authorized pilot program for judges to take related cases from other 
judges in the name of judicial efficiency). 
 151. Long & Burnham, supra note 141, at 9. 
 152. See, e.g., GREGORY W. CORDER & DALE I. FOREMAN, NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICS FOR  
NON-STATISTICIANS: A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH 2 (2009) (stating that most researchers choose sample 
sizers at least as large as thirty); Alan Agresti & Yongyi Min, On Sample Size Guidelines for Teaching 
Inference About the Binomial Parameter in Introductory Statistics 1 (Aug. 15, 2002) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://www.stat.ufl.edu/~aa/articles/agresti_min_binomial.pdf (identifying the 
similarity a population distribution obtains with a normal distribution when sample sizes are thirty or 
greater as the reason for suggesting a sample size of thirty in the first place). 
 153. Scott, supra note 5, at 25. 
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Finally, the most noteworthy objection is that the data on which the 
studies relied is unreliable. A random spot check conducted by Federal 
Defenders of the TRAC Reports revealed several inaccuracies, and TRAC 
appears to have taken some of its data from documents that are compiled 
for the purpose of budgetary requests, not sentencing research.154 To the 
extent budgetary documents carry their own biases, the data may be less 
reliable. What’s more, the Commission draws its data from paperwork 
completed by courts, but judges do not always fill out those reports; 
courtroom deputies or probation officers sometimes do.155 And there are 
often multiple ways for a person filling out the paperwork to represent 
the same sentencing factor. Despite these difficulties, nobody has yet 
introduced a better proposal for measuring inter-judge disparity. And the 
Commission and Congress consider the data good enough for the 
Commission to satisfy its duty to research and report on sentencing 
patterns.156 Moreover, as explained in greater detail below, the proposal 
in this Article does not depend on the precision of the data. Rather, the 
proposal uses the data to shift the focus of judges’ onto the sentencing 
patterns of other judges on the same court.157 Even if the data suffers 
from reliability issues, it is still sufficient to create this paradigm-shifting 
function because the benefit of this Article’s proposal is intended to be 
felt more in the aggregate than on the individual level. 
Although good reasons exist to be skeptical of these studies, the 
studies’ consistent findings coupled with the knowledge that Booker took 
away the greatest weapon under the Sentencing Reform Act against 
inter-judge disparity make it easy to conclude with high confidence that 
inter-judge disparity has become more problematic in the post-Booker 
world. It is not an understatement to say that the weight of scholarly 
authority strongly favors the notion that Booker has caused an increase 
in inter-judge disparity. 
II.  A PROPOSAL FOR PRESUMED UNREASONABLENESS 
The weight of the evidence above shows that inter-judge disparity 
has increased and will likely grow worse as newer judges who never 
sentenced under the mandatory Guidelines take the bench. But a return 
to a mandatory regime158 would pursue a reduction in inter-judge 
 154. Sentencing Res. Counsel Project, Fed. Pub. Defs., TRAC’s Report Claiming “Surprising 
Judge-to-Judge Variation” Fails to Compare Similar Cases, Relies on Poor Quality Data, Uses an 
Unreliable Method of Identifying Case Type, Uses Incorrect Methods of Reporting Sentence Length, 
and Contains Numerous Errors, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 20, 25–26 (2012).  
 155. Nancy Gertner, Judge Identifiers, TRAC, and a Perfect World, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 46, 47 (2012). 
 156. 28 U.S.C. §§ 995(a)(12), (14)-(16) (2012). 
 157. See Part II; Part III.A.3.  
 158. Congress could constitutionally return to a mandatory regime by adopting, through statute, 
the remedy proposed by the main Booker dissent: providing for mandatory Guidelines only when the 
facts necessary to a sentence are either admitted to by the defendant or found beyond a reasonable 
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disparity at the expense of creating unwarranted uniformity. After the 
mandatory Guidelines era, there is little reason to suggest that sentencing 
can be pressed into a rigorous, scientific system that places a quantifiable 
weight on every single relevant sentencing factor. 
Instead, reducing inter-judge disparity must be pursued through 
indirect means that have ancillary effects on sentencing behavior. The 
problem that caused an increase in inter-judge disparity was not Booker 
alone; it was the subsequent reduction of any meaningful system of 
appellate review. Increasing appellate review is the logical reform, but 
the details are elusive. Notably, increasing appellate review raises some 
constitutional issues. A system of appellate review that is (1) tied to the 
Guidelines and (2) so constraining as to make the Guidelines system de 
facto mandatory likely violates the Sixth Amendment as construed by the 
Court since Booker.159 
It follows that an effective form of stricter appellate review should 
be independent of the Guidelines. But to adequately reduce inter-judge 
disparity, the appellate review system must also induce judges to provide 
greater justifications for their sentences and make judges more aware of 
their own sentencing tendencies in relation to the sentences their peers 
impose. Simply knowing how a judge’s peers sentence should have an 
anchoring effect on most judges,160 and creating a rebuttable 
presumption of unreasonableness should induce judges to engage more 
critically with the distinctions between each specific sentence, an effect 
that would itself reduce inter-judge disparity. 
This reform could be achieved under existing law, which requires 
judges to consider “the need to avoid unwarranted disparities among” 
similarly situated offenders.161 But because the Supreme Court has 
layered onto appellate review an abuse-of-discretion standard,162 
rendering appellate review effectively toothless, and because the record 
in a given case rarely includes evidence of what sentences similarly 
situated offenders received, the best chance for achieving this reform lies 
in a statutory amendment. Congress should require appellate courts to 
presume that a sentence is unreasonable if the sentence falls too far from 
the median sentence similarly situated offenders receive. (Part IV 
explores the methodology the Commission should adopt in defining 
categories of similarly situated offenders.) This statute could be added to 
18 U.S.C. § 3742 to establish the following: 
doubt by a jury. 
 159. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 47 (2007) (prohibiting a presumption of 
unreasonableness for sentences outside the Guidelines). 
 160. See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 113, at 1128 (establishing that study participants’ 
estimates of the percentage of African countries in the United Nations were strongly influenced by 
what number arbitrarily appeared in a game of chance before they made their estimates).  
 161. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2016). 
 162. Gall, 552 U.S. at 41.  
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Presumption of Unreasonableness: A court of appeals shall presume 
a sentence is unreasonable when it departs too far from the median 
sentence for like offenders. This presumption can be rebutted if the court 
of appeals finds that the sentencing judge’s explanation is sufficiently 
compelling. 
The Sentencing Commission shall have the authority to define categories 
of like offenders and determine how far a sentence may vary before being 
presumed unreasonable.163 
Congress could itself determine exactly how to define categories of 
like offenders, but it is likely the specific details may be crime-dependent 
and that the Sentencing Commission, as the institution with greater 
expertise in this matter, is in a better position to tailor specific formulas 
to specific crimes. 
The benefits of the proposal are explored in detail in Part III. Briefly, 
this reform would accomplish two important things: it would avoid 
constitutional problems by creating an appellate system wholly outside 
the Guidelines (but which uses data created by the Guidelines system), 
and it would create a system that has indirect ameliorating effects on 
inter-judge disparity. By allowing judges to overcome the presumption of 
unreasonableness, this reform would create a system where judges would 
be required to include more detailed and comprehensive explanations for 
their sentences. Although the § 3553(a) factors already require judges to 
avoid unwarranted disparities among similarly situated offenders,164 this 
proposal would require even greater justification when a judge decides to 
sentence an offender too far from the median. 
This Article suggests that courts presume that a sentence is 
unreasonable when the sentence falls within the bottom or top fifteen 
percent of sentences that similarly situated offenders receive. (An 
exception might be made when the difference between the bottom and 
top fifteen percent is, in absolute numbers, small. Inter-judge disparity 
carries comparatively less harm in those situations.) This number is 
exclusive: A sentence length would not be presumed unreasonable for 
falling in the ninetieth percentile if the same length also fell within the 
eighty-fourth percentile. The fifteen-percent figure is chosen for 
illustrative purposes. The figure might be too blunt to rectify inter-judge 
disparity across the board, or a more robust statistical metric, such as 
 163. Congress would also need to amend 28 U.S.C. § 994, which concerns the powers of the 
Commission, to read as follows:  
  The Sentencing Commission shall promulgate and distribute methods for defining 
categories of offenders who are similarly situated to the instant defendant. In doing so, the 
Commission shall detail which of the Commission’s individual offender database variables 
shall be used, how many years of sentencing data should be included in the sample, what 
the minimum sample size of similarly situated defendants should be, how to treat 
Guidelines amendments, and any other factors that would be appropriate to implement the 
appellate system of review spelled out in 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
 164. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2016). 
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median absolute deviation, might be more appropriate.165 This Article 
uses the fifteen-percent figure merely for illustrative purposes. 
A few safeguards may also be established to avoid placing too much 
focus on this reform at the expense of the guidelines and to avoid 
drowning the already voluminous dockets of many courts. This proposal 
affords no official place for sentencing data at the initial sentencing 
decision, so this proposal should not increase litigation costs at that 
stage. And the proposal can avoid excessive appealsfederal appellate 
courts already receive more than 3000 procedural reasonableness 
challenges each year166by making appeal permissive only. Defendants 
will not be permitted to appeal unless they are granted something similar 
to a certificate of appealability in the habeas context by a neutral federal 
authority whose job it is to review each sentence and notify those 
defendants who are eligible to appeal. Part IV shows that calculating 
whether a sentence is presumptively unreasonable should take very little 
time. Permissive appeal is appropriate because the system of appellate 
review proposed in this Article is designed to affect inter-judge disparity 
at the aggregate level. Appeals are the vehicle the proposal uses to obtain 
a shift in the sentencing conversation, encourage judges to be more 
thorough in their sentencing habits, and indirectly inform judges about 
the sentencing habits of their peers in ways that will mitigate the effects 
of inter-judge disparity on all offenders. 
III.  THE BENEFITS OF THE PROPOSAL 
A. DISTINCTIONS FROM EXISTING PROPOSALS 
Before outlining in detail the merits of this proposal and defending 
its constitutionality, it is worth exploring how this proposal differs from 
other suggested proposals and avoids some of the weaknesses that affect 
those proposals. 
1.    Systematic Reforms 
Some reforms suggested shortly after the Supreme Court decided 
Booker are now foreclosed by precedent,167 but others remain. The 
 165. Using the median absolute deviationwhich measures the statistical dispersion centered 
around the median instead of the meaninstead of the standard deviation, would likely be more 
appropriate because this more robust statistical measure better protects against the influence of 
outlier sentences. The sentencing data does not fall into a normal distribution, where the mean and 
median would be the same, because of a number of factors: The Guidelines exercise a large anchoring 
effect on judges, and there is a strong inclination among judges to sentence at the bottom of a 
calculated range when judges do not depart. Supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. Sentencing 
data does not come close to resembling a normal distribution, so the median is a more appropriate 
tool of analysis because it diminishes the significance of outlier sentences such as life sentences. 
 166. 2013 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 107, at tbl.59; 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 107, at tbl.59. 
 167. Several individuals, including Professor Frank Bowman and then-Attorney General Alberto 
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Constitution Project Sentencing Initiative, which included then-Judge 
Alito, proposed that the Guidelines effectively be re-written. The 
sentencing ranges would be wider; the adjustments would be found by a 
jury (or admitted to by the offender); and judges would enjoy more 
permissive departures than under the Guidelines.168 Judge William 
Sessions, who served on the Commission from 1999–2010, proposed a 
similar reform.169 Sessions believed advisory Guidelines “are by 
definition unenforceable and thus allow for the emergence of sentencing 
disparities that motivated many American sentencing reforms in the first 
instance.”170 He pushed for a binding approach with “sub-ranges” within 
the wider ranges; the wider ranges would be mandatory, and judges 
would use the presence or absence of aggravating factors to sentence 
within sub-ranges.171 Departures “would need to be based on truly 
extraordinary mitigating circumstances” and would be subject to 
“relatively strict” appellate review; appellate courts would review the 
sufficiency of the evidence for whether mandatory aggravating factors 
were proved to a jury.172 
Judge William Pryor, who currently serves as Acting Chair of the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission, recently proposed a reform similar to the 
reform Sessions proposed. Like Sessions’s reform, Pryor’s would be 
much simpler than the current Guidelines and would include broad, 
effectively binding ranges, which he calls “presumptive.”173 “[O]nly the 
most important and common aggravating and mitigating factors” would 
remain for calculating a guidelines range, and a jury would have to find 
those factors.174 The more complicated and sui generis aggravators and 
mitigators would be moved to the commentary section of the Guidelines 
Gonzalez, proposed “topless guidelines” where judges would be bound by the minimum calculated 
guideline ranges but would have advisory maximum ranges. Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker: 
Advisory Guidelines in the Federal System, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 341, 356–64 (2006). This form of 
guidelines is, under current doctrine, undoubtedly unconstitutional. See Alleyne v. United States, 133 
S. Ct. 2151, 2162–63 (2013) (requiring any factor that increases the mandatory minimum of a crime to 
be proved before a jury). 
 168. CONSTITUTION PROJECT SENTENCING INITIATIVE, Recommendations for Federal Criminal 
Sentencing in a Post-Booker World, 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 310, 314–17 (2006); see also Bowman, supra 
note 96, at 364 (summarizing the plan). 
 169. Sessions III, supra note 17, at 337–53. Bowman endorsed both Sessions’ and the Constitution 
Project Sentencing Initiative’s proposals. Bowman, supra note 96, at 364. 
 170. Sessions III, supra note 17, at 339 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Kevin R. Reitz, 
The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional Law at Cross-Purposes, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1082, 1114 (2005)). 
 171. Sessions III, supra note 17, at 347. 
 172. Sessions III, supra note 17, at 351, 354. 
 173. William H. Pryor, Jr., Returning to Marvin Frankel’s First Principles in Federal Sentencing, 
29 FED. SENT’G REP. 95, 98 (2017). 
 174. Id. 
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and would affect only where within a “presumptive” guideline range a 
judge decided to sentence a defendant.175 
The Commission has proposed several reforms. First, it asked for a 
statutory change that would require judges to abide by a “three-step” 
process: judges would first calculate the Guidelines, consider the 
Commission’s commentary and policy statementswhich are strongly 
oriented toward preventing departuresand finally consider the 
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors.176 Second, the Commission asked Congress 
to codify its policy statements that currently conflict with congressional 
statutory policy. Congress requires the Commission to “assure the 
guidelines . . . reflect the general inappropriateness of considering the 
education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and 
responsibilities, and community ties of the defendant.”177 But Congress 
also requires judges to consider the “history and characteristics of the 
defendant,”178 which has created a “tension” between statutory law and 
the provisions in the Guidelines that instruct judges to ignore certain 
offender characteristics.179 Finally, and most importantly, the 
Commission asked Congress to create a presumption of reasonableness 
for within-Guideline sentences, require proportionally “greater 
justification[s]” when sentences are further outside the guideline range 
(abrogating Gall), and require appellate courts to apply a heightened 
standard of review when district courts disagree with the Commission’s 
policy statements.180 
The American Bar Association’s proposal adopts the position taken 
by the main Booker dissent, which argued that the correct remedy in 
Booker was to require the government to prove aggravating elements to 
juries.181 But because presenting to a jury every single relevant element 
of an offense is procedurally unmanageable, the ABA proposes that the 
Guidelines be greatly simplified to reduce the number of adjustments, 
 175. Id.  
 176. Uncertain Justice: The Status of Federal Sentencing and the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
Six Years After U.S. v. Booker: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and 
Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 55–60 (2011) (statement of Judge Patti 
B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sent’g Comm’n), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/ 
congressional-testimony-and-reports/testimony/20111012_Saris_Testimony.pdf. 
 177. 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (2012). The Commission has adopted this policy. U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H, introductory cmt. (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
 178. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2016). 
 179. Uncertain Justice, supra note 176, at 57; see also Improving the Advisory Guideline System 
Public Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n app. question 4 (Feb. 16, 2012) (statement of 
Henry Bemporad, Fed. Pub. Def., W. Dist. of Tex.), https://www.fd.org/sites/default/files/ 
criminal_defense_topics/essential_topics/sentencing_resources/defender_recommendations/bem
porad_statement_2_16_12.pdf (requesting that Congress codify the Commission’s policy statements 
that education, family ties, etc., are “not ordinarily relevant”). 
 180. Uncertain Justice, supra note 176, at 55–56. 
 181. Berman, supra note 167, at 365. 
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offense levels, and other complex factors.182 Under this proposal, a 
prosecutor who sought to obtain a higher sentence for a robbery would 
have to allege in an indictment, “in addition to the elements of robbery, 
whether the defendant possessed a firearm, whether he brandished or 
discharged it, [or] whether he threatened death,” among other things.183 
A separate proposal calls not for a new set of guidelines but instead 
a reformulation of what it means for a judge or jury to make fact findings. 
Douglas Berman and Stephanos Bibas argue that a distinction exists 
between facts about the offender and facts about the offense.184 
According to Berman and Bibas, juries have historically discerned 
offense facts and should continue to do so, but courts are better equipped 
to discern offender facts. The implication of the distinction is that a 
legislature might establish guidelines that bind judges based on facts 
judges discern that relate to the offender, not to the offense. 
Whatever merits or demerits these proposals have on other grounds, 
they are poorly suited to attacking inter-judge disparity. The proposals 
offered by Sessions, and the Commission re-create the Guidelines in 
much of their complex rigor. Amy Baron-Evans and Professor Kate Stith 
characterize the Commission’s proposal as one meant to “undo the 
holdings of the Supreme Court in Booker and its progeny and to 
reestablish the Commission’s guidelines and policy statements as the 
‘law’ of sentencing.”185 Pryor’s and the ABA’s are much simpler, but they 
too lack the ability to attack inter-judge disparity head-on. To the extent 
any of these proposals will increase uniformity, they will have an 
incidental and marginal effect on inter-judge disparity as well, but the 
wide ranges that would be established under these proposals suggest that 
inter-judge disparity would remain high. At the price of avoiding 
unwarranted uniformitya noteworthy goalthese proposals are 
unable to fully address inter-judge disparity. 
Some of these proposals also operate on constitutionally tenuous 
grounds under the current doctrine of the Supreme Court. The Court has 
exercised tremendous influence in the area of reasonableness review 
under the Guidelines, and it is not necessarily clear that a stricter system 
would not draw out the Sixth Amendment issue Booker tried to put away. 
Several scholars argue that Booker and its progeny create a delicate 
balance between judicial discretion and uniformity, a balance that can be 
easily upset.186 Baron-Evans and Stith have directly declared Sessions’ 
 182. Am. Bar Ass’n, Crim. J. Sec., Report on Booker and Recommendation, 17 FED. SENT’G REP. 
335, 339 (2005). 
 183. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 254 (2005). 
 184. Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO ST. J CRIM. L. 37, 
38 (2006).  
 185. Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 24, at 1731.  
 186. Hessick, supra note 24, at 1336, 1348 (“[T]here is little doubt that this recommendation would 
shift the delicate balance the Court has struck after Booker away from district court discretion towards 
DIVINE-69.3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/2018 4:00 PM 
April 2018]            BOOKER DISPARITY AND DATA-DRIVEN SENTENCING 801 
and the Commission’s proposals unconstitutional.187 And the 
Commission’s proposal to require appellate courts to presume that 
within-Guidelines sentences are reasonable directly contradicts Rita’s 
holding that such presumptions be permitted out of a “desire to avoid 
creating a bias for within-Guidelines sentences.”188 The Commission’s 
proposal creates that bias. It and other proposals may very well be 
constitutional, but a rigorous assessment of constitutionality is required, 
and the proposals largely lack constitutional analysis. 
2.   Calls for Stronger Appellate Review 
Arguably, “Booker left unclear exactly how loose appellate review 
must be to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.”189 Some scholars maintain that 
Congress should require appellate courts to apply a sufficiency-of-the-
evidence standard to judicial fact-finding.190 Additionally,  
then-Professor Stephanos Bibas argues that Congress should create 
sentencing courts, prohibit defendants from waiving their rights to 
appeal, and require political diversity on appellate panels.191 Professor 
Crystal S. Yang argues for courts to require a “heightened justification for 
more severe departures.”192 
These scholars are generally on the right track. The problem with 
the post-Booker system is the same as the main problem that afflicted 
indeterminate sentencing: the system lacks meaningful appellate review. 
But these scholars call for greater appellate review without fleshing out 
what the systems would look like or defending the constitutionality of the 
systems, which is critical because Booker struck down stronger appellate 
review and other scholars have identified constitutional problems with 
increasing appellate review.193 Bibas, for example, readily acknowledges 
that precedent bars the sufficiency-of-evidence proposal.194 
Furthermore, none of these proposals are well-tailored toward reducing 
inter-judge disparity. Yang limits her form of appellate review to 
sentences outside guideline ranges, which would prevent her form of 
the Guidelines.”); Hessick & Hessick, supra note 99, at 3–4 (describing the balance as increasing 
judicial discretion to avoid the Sixth Amendment problem, but creating some appellate review to 
pursue uniformity).  
 187. Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 24, at 1716–31 (arguing that Booker requires any Guidelines 
system to be advisory). 
 188. Hessick, supra note 24, at 1347. 
 189. Bibas et al., supra note 113, at 1372–73. 
 190. Bibas et al., supra note 113; O’Hear, supra note 113, at 752 (arguing that courts should create 
an “explanation review”). 
 191. Bibas et al., supra note 184, at 1373. 
 192. Yang, supra note 107, at 1333. 
 193. Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 24, at 1731. 
 194. Bibas et al., supra note 113, at 1396 (“[T]he Court’s jurisprudence is deeply misguided. 
Binding guidelines and searching appellate review are needed to make sentencing more consistent and 
legitimate.”). 
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review from considering inter-judge disparity that occurs within 
guideline ranges. 
3.   Trailing Edge Guidelines and Statistical Curving 
Professor Mark Osler describes uniformity and discretion as 
historically antagonistic to each other. To solve this problem, he suggests 
that the government create a computer system through which judges 
enter specific sentencing data to see what sentences similarly-situated 
offenders received. This notably would achieve some of the same goals as 
this systemnamely, making judges more aware of the sentences issued 
by other judges. Osler also suggests that appellate courts apply a 
heightened standard of review when sentences stray too far from 
sentences of those other judges.195 
In Osler’s system, however, the common sentencing practices of 
judges would become the Guidelines, and the Commission’s role would 
be limited to defining mitigating or aggravating circumstances without 
placing numerical offense levels on those circumstances.196 Although 
Osler’s proposal has some appeal because the Commission claims to have 
created the Guidelines in the first place based on historical sentencing 
practice,197 the proposal in this Article pursues a different tactic in 
response to information derived from a review of the sentencing data. 
Foremost, this Article’s proposal permits a greater degree of 
forward-looking modifications to the Guidelines. Osler’s model seeks to 
institute a method that would provide feedback regarding sentencing 
practices,198 but it also risks entrenching past practices by ensuring that 
previous sentences have a strong gravitational effect on future sentences. 
This Article’s proposal leaves more room for the Commission to amend 
the Guidelines in numerical ways, such as the Commission did when it 
reduced the drug quantity table by two levels.199 
Second, this Article’s proposal more strongly adheres to the ability 
of the Guidelines to act as an anchor. Osler’s proposal seeks to be more 
transformational, but by prohibiting the Commission from attaching 
numerical offense levels to aggravating and mitigating factors,200 Osler’s 
 195. Mark Osler, The Promise of Trailing-Edge Sentencing Guidelines to Resolve the Conflict 
between Uniformity and Judicial Discretion, 14 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 203, 207, 234 (2012). 
 196. Id. at 230, 243. 
 197. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL CH. 1(A)(1)(3) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015) (noting 
that the Commission started with an “empirical approach that used as a starting point data estimating 
pre-guidelines sentencing practice”). 
 198. Osler, supra note 195, at 230. 
 199. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 29-36 (April 30, 
2014), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/reader-friendly-amend 
ments/20140430_RF_Amendments.pdf (displaying a two-level reduction from previous years in the 
base offense level assigned to various drug quantities). 
 200.  Osler, supra note 195, at 229. 
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model would make it difficult for judges to compare aggravating and 
mitigating factors with each other because the computer system would 
show only the end sentence, not how a judge arrived at it. For instance, 
the current Guidelines dictate that a defendant’s intent to promote 
terrorism should be weighed six times as heavily as physically restraining 
a victim,201 and it is twice as mitigating when an offender is a “minimal” 
participant than when he is a “minor” participant.202 This Article’s 
proposal retains this useful information. 
Finally, this Article’s proposal expands on some of the limits of 
Osler’s model by synchronizing the basic idea of computer-generated, 
data-driven sentencing with the actual data itselfsomething that was 
beyond the scope of Osler’s initial article. It turns out that the data, while 
enormous, is not robust enough to apply Osler’s model. As laid out in Part 
IV, below, the Commission’s data files show that, as the number of 
compared factors increases, the sample sizes rapidly decrease. The 
dataset is too small for a meaningful analysis of sentencing patterns when 
the set is filtered by more than a few data points. Osler suggests that 
judges could input the specific offense characteristics associated with a 
crime into the computer.203 But the data shows that this method would 
shrink the population sample beyond usefulness. For instance, the 
Guidelines category for basic forms of fraud (section 2B1.1) includes 
nineteen specific offense characteristics. The presence or absence of 
these offense characteristics is not random, but assuming for the sake of 
illustration that each characteristic is equally likely, only 1 in 524,288 
offenders under section 2B1.1 would exactly match any other 
defendant204 before general enhancements are even factored in. Only 
about 70,000 defendants are convicted each year for all Guidelines 
categories, much less for section 2B1.1. Of course, the presence of offense 
characteristics is not random, but even if including all those variables 
would sometimes produce a sufficiently large sample size, including 
more than a few variables risks overcomplicating the system enough to 
render it ineffective. A more complicated system would be less likely to 
be well-received and would increase the risk of error. 
Another scholar recently published a proposal that bears some 
similarity to Osler’s and to the proposal in this Article. Adi Leibovitch 
remarks that specialized courts and courts of varying geographic 
jurisdictions exhibit different sentencing patterns. She argues that those 
 201.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 3A1.3, 3A1.4 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
 202.  Id. at § 3B1.2. 
 203.  Osler, supra note 195, at 233 (including as one of the factors to be considered in the search 
for similarly situated offenders the fact that an offender robbed a bank). 
 204.  Assuming that each characteristic is equally likely to be absent as it is likely to be present, the 
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patterns arise because judges sentence offenders based on how 
blameworthy an offender is in relation to other offenders a judge sees.205 
Judges who sentence only relatively low-level offenders tend to sentence 
those offenders more harshly than do courts of general jurisdiction.206 
Leibovitch argues that courts should use computers to review the 
distributions of sentences from other courts and employ “statistical 
curving” to ensure that sentences correlate with those issued in other 
jurisdictions.207  
Leibovitch’s article, like Osler’s, suggests that past sentences should 
effectively become the guidelines judges use to sentence offenders. This 
backward-looking proposal is distinct from a proposal that seeks to 
employ sentencing data at the appellate stage. By introducing data into 
the equation at the sentencing stage instead of only the appellate stage, 
Leibovitch’s proposal runs the same risk as Osler’s: that previous 
sentencing practices will anchor judges, causing defense attorneys and 
prosecutors to fight over that data. For that reason, Leibovitch’s proposal 
would similarly risk freezing current sentencing in place. Although 
district court judges could look at sentencing data as part of the proposal 
in this Articleindeed, they can do that alreadythis Article’s proposal 
makes review of sentencing data an official part of sentencing policy only 
at the appellate stage, so it avoids much of the risk of freezing and ensures 
that the Sentencing Commission can make policy changes. Although 
Leibovitch mentions that appellate courts could review sentencing 
information and press more weight against sentences that deviate 
significantly from mine-run sentences,208 establishing the contours of 
what that appellate system would look like is beyond the scope of her 
article. This Article, in contrast, develops a methodology in Part IV and 
identifies that the abuse-of-discretion standard is significantly 
responsible for the increase in inter-judge disparity. 
B. THE PROPOSAL IS SOUND POLICY 
To date, nobody has proposed a reform that accomplishes what the 
proposal outlined in this Article would. Indeed, only Osler’s and 
Leibovitch’s come close to targeting inter-judge disparity, which was a 
central aim of the Sentencing Reform Act and continues to frame debates 
on sentencing today.209 Following Booker, the Guidelines fall short of 
 205. Adi Leibovitch, Punishing on a Curve, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1205, 1224–33 (2017). 
 206. Id. at 1207. 
 207. Id. at 1256, 1261. 
 208. Id.  
 209. Hofer, supra note 8, at 39. But cf. Judge Nancy Gertner, How to Talk About Sentencing 
Policyand Not Disparity, 46 LOY. C. CHI. L.J. 313 (2014) (remarking that disparity is “far, far less 
important than issues of sentencing fairness, of proportionality, of what works to address crime” and 
that rampant sentencing disparity is a myth). 
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reducing inter-judge disparity, although they are not completely 
dissociated from these goals to the extent they anchor judges. 
This proposal addresses inter-judge disparity without repeating the 
error the Act made when it drastically reduced judicial discretion. Before 
the Act, broad judicial discretion had been universal, rarely challenged, 
and explicitly upheld by the Supreme Court.210 Congress attempted to 
reduce inter-judge disparity by significantly reducing discretion, but the 
problem was not in discretion alone; it was in the absence of meaningful 
appellate review. When Congress did increase appellate review, it did so 
only to enforce the mandatory nature of the Guidelines.211  
As the studies explored above have now indirectly demonstrated, 
this lax appellate standard has proven ineffectual. Booker implemented 
an unusual form of appellate court review and then gutted its central 
aspects to afford district court judges extremely broad discretion.212 
Those appellate forms of review that remain are impotent. District courts 
can disregard Guidelines policies;213 substantive reasonableness 
challenges are almost never successful;214 and procedural reasonableness 
review is relatively unchallenging.215  
As opposed to the proposals that seek a fundamental transformation 
of the Guidelines system, this proposal instead creates a system that 
supplements the Guidelines, makes judges more aware of the sentences 
issued by their peers without formally introducing the use of sentencing 
data at the initial stage of sentencing, and induces judges to provide 
greater justifications for their sentences. Judges already must 
“adequately explain the chosen sentence”216 in a way that is at least 
somewhat proportional to the amount of departure from a guideline 
range.217 But the Court’s doctrine makes “adequate” mean hardly more 
than “minimal”218 and does little to reduce inter-judge disparity. This 
reform increases the floor for what constitutes an “adequate” explanation 
for offenders who receive sentences that deviate from the norm. 
 210. See supra Part I.A. 
 211. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2006). 
 212. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 99, at 3, 14. 
 213. See supra notes 102–104 and accompanying text. 
 214. See supra note 107. 
 215. See supra notes 108–109 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2012) 
(requiring sentencing judges to include a statement of reasons when sentencing an offender). 
 217. The holding in Rita requires sentencing judges to “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate 
court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own 
legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). The judge will 
“normally go further and explain why he has rejected” arguments to depart from the Guidelines, and 
“[w]here the judge imposes a sentence outside the Guidelines, the judge will explain why he has done 
so.” Id. at 357. It is also “uncontroversial that a major departure should be supported by a more 
significant justification than a minor one” and that a judge must “adequately explain the chosen 
sentence.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007). 
 218. See supra Part I.B. 
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For example, in addition to requiring higher justifications for 
sentences in general, this proposal also requires higher justifications for 
inter-judge disparity that occurs within guideline ranges. In doing so, this 
proposal far exceeds anything the Court or Congress has required. 
Present doctrine assumes away any concern for this form of disparity; the 
Court has held that no explanation beyond relying on the Guidelines’ 
internal reasoning will generally be warranted for these sentences.219 
Congress has also failed to recognize the existence of this form of 
disparity. The statute that covers appellate reversal for failure to provide 
a statement of reasons permits vacating a sentence only when the 
sentence lies outside the calculated guideline range.220 Yet most judges 
sentence at the bottom of a calculated range,221 causing disparity 
whenever a judge sentences elsewhere within the range. This form of 
disparity is particularly harmful because judges who sentence within a 
guideline range can rest easy knowing they will almost certainly be 
affirmed.222 
This proposal gives greater effect to the Court’s nominal 
requirement that judges adequately explain their sentences. Booker 
implied the standard of reasonableness review from the Sentencing 
Reform Act (after excising the provisions that made the Guidelines 
mandatory).223 This proposal asks Congress to revamp that standard to 
put more pressure onto sentencing judges to adequately explain their 
sentences. As laid out below, increasing the burden on sentencing judges 
to adequately justify their sentences will have both ameliorative effects 
on inter-judge disparity and other incidental benefits that reduce general 
disparity. 
1.   Effect on Judges 
The proposal in this Article would carry several benefits. Most 
notably, it would shift the conversation in sentencing by inducing judges 
to provide greater justifications for their sentences. This proposal 
permits district court judges to rebut the presumption of 
unreasonableness by creating a more robust explanation for why the 
defendant merits the sentence issued. The practice of including greater 
written justifications, even if unaccompanied by significant differences 
in sentencing behavior or reversal rates, would rectify at least some  
 219. Rita, 551 U.S. at 356–57. 
 220. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f) (2012). The only exceptions are when the sentence is otherwise unlawful, 
is incorrectly implied, or where the offense has no applicable guideline range, limiting an appellate 
court to remand only if the sentence “is plainly unreasonable.” Id. The presence of these exceptions 
has been criticized as violating Booker. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 307 n.6 (2005) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). 
 221. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text. 
 222. Gertner, supra note 209, at 319. 
 223. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261. 
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inter-judge disparity because it would create a written record that would 
establish that an offender is not similarly situated to other offenders. 
What’s more, this proposalincluding, as it does, a presumption of 
unreasonablenesswould almost certainly increase the reversal rate. 
Judges who were at all risk averse and who doubted that they might be 
able to craft a sufficiently compelling justification for a sentence would 
likely moderate that sentence. And this proposal carries little risk that the 
gravitation of sentences will be so moderating that sentences become de 
facto uniform because this proposal largely targets harsher and more 
lenient judges. 
A second and related major benefit of this proposal is the increased 
awareness judges would obtain of the sentencing practices of their peers. 
Many judges are largely unaware of sentences issued by other judges on 
the same court,224 and rarely does information about the sentencing 
practices of other judges appear in the record. But under this proposal, 
outlier judges who do not already know that their sentencing practices 
deviate will quickly learn as much. And unlike Osler’s and Leibovitch’s 
proposals, which run the risk of placing too much focus on the sentences 
other judges issue, this proposal reaps the benefits of introducing 
sentencing data into the system without drawing too much focus away 
from the Guidelines. It does so by formally introducing sentencing data 
only at the appellate stage. Some sentencing judges may, of course, 
consult the sentencing data on their ownand judges are more likely to 
do so if they can decrease their chances of being reversedbut nothing 
suggests that consultation will shift the focus of sentencing from the 
Guidelines to sentencing data. Under current doctrine, judges will still be 
required to calculate guideline ranges, but nothing will require judges to 
consult the sentencing data. 
The incidental effect this proposal would have on increasing judicial 
awareness of peer practices would also assist those judges with satisfying 
an obligation they already are required to meet but that is difficult to 
meet. When sentencing, judges must consider “the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records 
who have been found guilty of similar conduct.”225 In the light of the 
numerous studies that establish that inter-judge disparity has increased 
significantly over the last decade, it is clear this provision has minimal 
practical effect. One reason is that the sentences of similarly situated 
offenders are rarely in the record. The proposal in this Article, by 
increasing judicial awareness of other sentences, partly rectifies this 
problem. 
Another benefit of this proposal is that it tackles inter-judge 
disparity indirectly. The indirectness of the proposal carries some 
 224. Kopf, supra note 2, at 50. 
 225. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2012). 
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downsides: it bestows the benefit of enhanced appellate review only on 
those who receive the harshest and most lenient sentences even though 
inter-judge disparity also affects people who receive mine-run sentences. 
But the indirectness of this proposal is precisely why it should be 
effective. The proposal is geared toward aggregate, not individual, 
change. The Sentencing Reform Act employed a heavy-handed approach 
to try to directly eliminate inter-judge disparity. That approach created a 
host of other problems. But when judges provide greater justifications for 
their sentences, their actions will mitigate inter-judge disparity for all 
offenders. In targeting harsher and more lenient sentences, this proposal 
will disproportionately affect harsher and more lenient judges. These 
judges will either find themselves reversed with great frequencywhich 
will convey important information to these judgesor will be deterred in 
a way that will cause them to give more attention to justifying their 
sentences. Judges who were initially unaware ofor 
underestimatedtheir harsher or more lenient tendencies will 
moderate. 
For similar reasons, this proposal will also attack one area of  
inter-judge disparity scholars have so far neglected to address: reducing 
inter-judge disparity within guideline ranges. Although appellate courts 
are not permitted to presume that sentences issued outside guideline 
ranges are unreasonable, they are permitted to presume that sentences 
within guideline ranges are reasonable.226 “[T]he presumption reflects 
the fact that . . . both the sentencing judge and the Sentencing 
Commission will have reached the same conclusion as to the proper 
sentence in the particular case. That double determination significantly 
increases the likelihood that the sentence is a reasonable one.”227 This 
presumption ordinarily makes it difficult to challenge inter-judge 
disparity that falls within a guideline range. No other scholar has yet 
proposed a solution that attacks within-range inter-judge disparity. This 
proposal does just that by removing the presumption of reasonableness 
for sentences that fall toward the tail ends of the distributions, regardless 
of whether those sentences fall within or outside of the guideline ranges. 
Finally, this proposal would target the particular risks of inter-judge 
disparity associated with judges who have taken senior status. Because 
judges on senior status are able to tailor their dockets,228 they are less 
likely to encounter a representative cross-section of cases. As Leibovitch 
has established, judges who sit on specialized courts tend to craft the 
severity of sentences in relation to the rest of their dockets, not in relation 
 226. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007). 
 227. Id.  
 228. 28 U.S.C. § 294(c) (2012) (requiring judges who have taken senior status to take on only as 
much work as they are “willing and able to undertake”). District courts can adopt more concrete 
regulations. 
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to all possible crimes.229 Because judges on senior status can exclude 
certain kinds of cases from their dockets, the same effect extends to them. 
This proposal mitigates that effect. 
2.   Minimal Effect on Anchoring 
The difficult task of an institution that crafts a sentencing regime 
that includes guidelines is discovering how to strike a balance between 
uniformity and individual treatment.230 The mandatory Guidelines 
focused too much on narrow uniformity. The advisory Guidelines 
technically permit a sentencing judge to issue whatever sentence she 
wishes, subject only to the constraint that the judge consider the 
guidelines and that the judge not issue a substantively unreasonable 
sentence. But the evidence establishes that, in practice, the Guidelines 
have a similar anchoring effect on judges across the country.231 This effect 
remains one of the strongest tools that prohibit inter-judge disparity 
from growing even worse, and this proposal does little to diminish that 
anchoring effect because it affords official use of sentencing data only at 
the appellate stage. By additionally limiting this system to individuals 
who have received a certificate of appealability,232 this system will help 
ensure that the Guidelines maintain their current locus in federal 
sentencing policy. Instead of undermining the focus on the Guidelines, a 
risk entailed by other proposals that have suggested that judges reference 
sentencing data, this proposal chips away at the excesses of individual 
treatment that the advisory Guidelines produce. 
3.   Effect on Non-Judicial Sources of Disparity 
This reform not only brings federal sentencing practice more in line 
with the central purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act; it also carries 
ancillary benefits. It is well established that judges are responsible for 
relatively little sentencing disparity compared to prosecutors.233 But 
 229. Leibovitch, supra note 205. 
 230. Barkow, supra note 97, at 1619. 
 231. Barkow, supra note 97, at 1621. 
 232. See supra Part II. 
 233. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 6 (2011) (identifying the 
shift in power from judges and juries to prosecutors as one of the key reasons for current criminal 
justice problems); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 4, at 101–02 (finding that, pre-Booker, 
statutes and Guidelines accounted for 73% of sentencing disparity, with judges accounting only for 
2.9% of sentencing disparity); Anderson et al., supra note 9, at 301 (detailing the significant impact 
regional prosecution policies through U.S. Attorney’s Offices have on inter-district sentencing 
disparity); Bunin, supra note 19, at 81 (identifying prosecutors as the greatest source of disparity; 
Hofer, supra note 8, at 39 (identifying mandatory minimums, prosecutor decisions, and plea 
bargaining decisions as more significant sources of disparity); cf. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 4, at 
130 (noting that prosecutors have gained greater relative control over sentencing than before the 
Sentencing Reform Act).  
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reducing inter-judge disparity has collateral effects on prosecutor-driven 
disparity. 
Prosecutors have numerous avenues to create disparity. In 
determining what charges to bring and whether to stipulate certain facts, 
prosecutors have a comparatively larger role in framing an offender’s 
record in relation to the actual offense. Prosecutor stipulations have 
increased since Booker, as have prosecutors’ demands that offenders 
who enter pleas waive their rights to appeal.234 And prosecutors pursue 
mandatory minimums at disparate rates. None of the eligible defendants 
in some districts were charged with mandatory minimums, but 
prosecutors in other districts charged three-quarters of eligible 
defendants with mandatory minimums.235 Prosecutors also control 
whether motions for sentencing enhancements or reductions are 
filedthey have the sole authority to file § 851 enhancement motions of 
information, which double an offender’s mandatory minimum 
sentenceand the vast majority of departures for substantial assistance 
are prosecutor-driven.236 
The sources of prosecutor-driven disparity are voluminous, and a 
tailored reform like the one presented in this Article can address only 
some of them. Although judges are often randomly assigned to cases, 
prosecutors often are not,237 which means prosecutors can tailor their 
conduct based on the judge who is assigned a case. It is this source of 
disparity that the reform presented in this Article can mitigate. For 
instance, prosecutors can tailor charges to a judge because they can often 
file a superseding indictment after a judge has been assigned.238 And 
because prosecutors are repeat players, they have the incentive to tailor 
their conduct to help ensure that future interactions are beneficial.239 But 
when a judge’s sentencing decisions are constrained not by the force of 
guideline ranges but by the need to construct a compelling explanation 
justifying a significant deviance from the median sentence, prosecutors 
will have proportionally less influence on these judges. 
This proposal also can rectify some racial disparity in sentencing. 
Although researchers disagree on the existence or extent of racial 
disparities in sentencing and whether those disparities are caused by 
 234. Ulmer & Light, supra note 11, at 338.  
 235. Yang, supra note 112, at 1323–24. 
 236. Although a judge can grant a departure for substantial assistance without a motion of the 
government, judges rarely do. Section 5K1.1 motions for substantial assistance from the government 
were recognized in 9482 cases last year. 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 107, at tbl.30 n.1. But judges 
recognized substantial assistance without a government motion in just over 400 cases. 2014 
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 107, at tbl.25, tbl.25A, tbl.25B. Prosecutors can also file for substantial 
assistance motions to reduce a sentence after an offender has been sentenced. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(B). 
 237. Hofer, supra note 8, at 41. 
 238. Yang, supra note 112, at 1278 n.43. 
 239. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) (arguing that 
cooperation can arise from self-interested motives alone). 
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sentencing decisions instead of the decisions made at the investigation or 
adjudication stages,240 the Sentencing Commission has released a report 
that finds a substantial increase in racial sentencing disparity after 
Booker.241 And the Acting Chair of the Commission recently reported that 
black male defendants are twenty-five percent less likely than white male 
defendants to receive downward variances sua sponte.242 To the extent 
some racial disparities arise from sentencing decisions instead of earlier 
decisionssuch as charging decisionsthis Article’s proposal 
ameliorates some of that racial disparity by narrowing the overall gap and 
incidentally the racial gap. 
4.   Further Positive Effects 
Tying the identities of judges to their sentencing habits has proved 
controversial. Opinions vary on whether judges need identity protection 
given their Article III protection,243 but this reform benefits from not 
requiring the disclosure of judicial identities, which may be a dealbreaker 
for some actors. 
Additionally, recognizing that inter-judge disparity is a relatively 
small part of the disparity equation, this proposal avoids aggravating 
those other sources of disparity. The same cannot be said of some other 
proposals. For instance, because some proposals increase prosecutorial 
powerlike the ABA proposalthey risk making disparity worse.244 
This proposal could also spark the development of a common law of 
sentencing in federal courts. Because the doctrine of sentencing review 
promulgated after Booker has been so deferential, precedent includes 
almost no guidance as to what “reasonable” means in the context of 
reasonableness review.245 The precise contours of what appellate review 
would look like does not lend itself to a ready explanation ex ante. 
Appellate review would instead be fleshed out through litigation in  
fact-specific scenarios. To the extent more sentences were reversed, the 
proposal in this Article would “creat[e] the building blocks of a common 
law of federal sentencing” that would define what is meant by a 
 240. Scott, supra note 4, at 716–18. 
 241. Scott, supra note 4, at 717. 
 242. Judge William Pryor, Remarks at Scalia Law School 7–8 (May 17, 2017), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/speeches-and-articles/20170517_Pryor-Remarks.pdf. 
 243. Compare, e.g., Scott, supra note 5, at 22 (arguing that the Commission’s policy of refusing to 
publicly disclose judge identifiers is rooted in a desire for judges to shield themselves from criticism–“an 
astonishing expectation for public officials who enjoy life tenure”), with Mosi Secret, Wide Sentencing 
Disparity Found Among U.S. Judges, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/03/06/nyregion/wide-sentencing-disparity-found-among-us-judges.html (identifying Justice 
Rehnquist as worrying “that collecting data on judges’ sentencing practices ‘could amount to an 
unwarranted and ill-considered effort to intimidate individual judges.’”). 
 244. Yang, supra note 112, at 1279. 
 245. See Laura I. Appleman, Toward a Common Law of Sentencing: Gall, Kimbrough, and the 
Search for Reasonableness, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 3, 3–4 (2008). 
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“reasonable” sentence.246 By requiring sentencing judges to increase the 
level of explanation for sentences that fall outside the mine-run, and by 
reviewing those explanations, a more robust common law of sentencing 
might begin to emerge. 
5.   The Limits of the Proposal 
Not every subpart of a system must be oriented toward the system’s 
overall goals. This proposal is limited to ameliorating inter-judge 
disparity, and it does so in a way that avoids impinging on the gains that 
Booker made247 while attacking the inter-judge disparity that Booker 
introduced. 
Because this proposal uses the appeals of individual sentences as a 
vehicle to enact broader, aggregate change, the proposal incurs some 
inequities. The proposal bestows the main ameliorative effects on all, but 
some individuals receive the additional, direct benefit of having access to 
a new appellate tool, and still others bear the burden of having to defend 
their lenient sentences. This inequity is small because this reform should 
largely lead to a shift in the sentencing conversationit will encourage 
judges to issue greater justificationsnot a dramatic increase in 
overturned sentences. The remaining inequities are acceptable because 
they enable the pursuit of broadly shared benefits that might be 
unobtainable without either this proposal or a much more severe 
proposal like mandatory guidelines. 
This proposal is also limited because of its reliance on data the 
Commission collects. This data largely comes from a Statement of 
Reasons form judges are supposed to submit to the Commission within 
30 days of sentencing an offender.248 When information is left off the 
form or is otherwise unavailable, the Commission pulls data from the 
Pre-Sentencing Reports probation officers compile to relay facts about 
the offense and the offender and to assist the judge at sentencing.249 This 
protocol can introduce inconsistencies. 
Former-Judge Nancy Gertner has declared the entire data set 
worthless for measuring inter-judge disparity. She argues the forms are 
 246. Id. at 3 (“A sentencing common law was something originally envisioned by the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission.”). 
 247. Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 24, at 1682–1703; see also Bunin, supra note 19, at 82–83 
(identifying judicial discretion as preventing more disparity than it causes in part because the 
Guidelines fail to take into account some mitigating factors). 
 248. 28 U.S.C. § 994(w) (2012). 
 249. To the extent possible, information is first taken from the Statement of Reasons. In addition 
to a few other forms, the Presentence Investigation Report prepared by the probation officers under 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 is used to fill gaps in the data obtained by the Statement of Reasons. U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, VARIABLE CODEBOOK FOR INDIVIDUAL DEFENDERS 2 (2015), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/researchandpublications/datafiles/Individual_Codeb
ook_FY99_FY14.pdf. 
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too “simplistic” and were designed only to help the Commission “monitor 
Guideline enforcement, principally departures.” She also contends that 
courtroom deputies or probation officers, not judges, routinely complete 
the forms.250 
To be sure, the sentencing data betrays inaccuracies and shows that 
not all individuals who submit data do so in a uniform manner. For 
example, the vast majority of judges who find no applicable mandatory 
minimum on the statutory form appropriately report the “statutory 
minimum” on the Statement of Reasons as “0.” But out of the more than 
10,000 drug trafficking cases in 2014 where the judge reported no 
applicable mandatory minimum, the data for more than 800 offenders 
inexplicably listed a non-zero value for the variable that shows a 
“statutory minimum.”251 The data for one offender showed he was subject 
to a statutory minimum of life but included a contradictory variable that 
indicated that “no count of conviction carries a mandatory sentence.” 
Despite this, another variable stated that a “mandatory minimum 
sentence [was] imposed.” Additionally, the data for 229 offenders 
exhibits that no counts of conviction carried a mandatory sentence, but 
the data also exposes that the judges somehow departed from mandatory 
minimum sentences.252 
Despite these errors, Gertner’s analysis may be overstated. Her 
criticisms derive from her experience on a court that may be 
unrepresentative of national practice. Further, data inaccuracies are 
inherent in any reasonably substantial dataset, and the Commission 
takes measures to mitigate data inaccuracy. Biannually, all data is 
compared with the sentencing data file held by the Administrative Office 
of the U.S. Courts to ensure accuracy, and sentences that fall outside a 
guideline range are reviewed by hand.253 
But even accepting all of Gertner’s criticism, the data remains the 
best source for defining categories of similarly situated offenders, and the 
Commission uses this data for its congressionally authorized research 
 250. Gertner, supra note 155, at 47. 
 251. This Article controls for the following factors to obtain this figure: the offender was sentenced 
under section 2D1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the judge issued a non-zero value for 
the variable that shows whether the offender was convicted under a statute bearing a statutory 
minimum, and a contradictory separate variable was present that signaled that “no count of conviction 
carries a mandatory sentence.” 
 252. This Article controls for the following factors to obtain this figure: the offender was sentenced 
under section 2D1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the judge issued a zero value for the 
variable that shows whether the offender was convicted under a statute bearing a statutory minimum, 
and a contradictory separate variable was present that signaled that “one or more counts of conviction 
carry mandatory [minimums] but the court determined it does not apply.” 
 253. Lou Reedt et al., Effective Use of Federal Sentencing Data, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 9 (2013), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/datafiles/20131122-ACS-
Presentation.pdf. 
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purposes.254 The shortcomings are relatively rare in a scheme where 
more than 70,000 offenders are sentenced each year. Especially 
considering that high precision is not necessary for this proposal, data 
that is good enough for the Commission ought to be good enough for this 
proposal, even if it is less than ideal. 
That leaves the practical limits of this appeal. As with any system 
that calls for new forms of information to be presented to judges, some 
logistical issues arise as to how data will be made accessible. But those 
issues are almost entirely administrative in nature, and computer 
accessibility places this specific reform within reach in a way not true in 
earlier decades. As explained in detail in Part IV, calculating whether a 
sentence should be presumed unreasonable is straightforward and would 
require no work from judges if administrative officials within the courts 
calculated sentences. 
C. THE PROPOSAL IS CONSTITUTIONAL 
The critical weakness in many of the proposals considered above is 
that there are good arguments that the proposals are unconstitutional 
and that none of the proposals sets out to defend itself on constitutional 
grounds.255 The constitutional concerns are two-fold. First, the Court 
may have crafted a delicate balance: the Court promoted judicial 
discretion to avoid the Sixth Amendment issue but also instituted a 
gutted form of appellate review to promote some uniformity.256 If, as 
some say, this balance is refined and delicate, then reducing judicial 
discretion to issue a non-Guidelines sentence might be constitutionally 
problematic.257 The second point of concern is that a constraint, even if 
not tied to the Guidelines, might still render an indirect effect on the 
Guidelines that makes them de facto mandatory. 
If a proposal reduces a judge’s discretion and ability to avoid a  
non-Guidelines sentence (the first point of concern), that proposal must 
wade through the Booker progeny. The case friendliest toward altering 
the forms of appellate review is Booker itself. In drawing up a remedy, 
the Booker majoritywhich included Justice Breyer, an architect of the 
original Guidelines from his days on the First Circuit258explicitly 
sought to divine “what ‘Congress would have intended’ in light of the 
Court’s constitutional holding.”259 From Congress’s decision to orient the 
Sentencing Reform Act toward promoting uniformity, the Court found 
 254. 28 U.S.C. § 995(a)(12), (14)–(16) (2012). 
 255. Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 24, at 1716–41. 
 256. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 99, at 3–4, 14. 
 257. Hessick, supra note 24, at 1348; see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 47 (2007) 
(prohibiting a presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the Guidelines). 
 258. Linda Greenhouse, Guidelines on Sentencing Are Flawed, Justice Says, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 1998), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/21/us/guidelines-on-sentencing-are-flawed-justice-says.html. 
 259. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005). 
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that Congress had implied a reasonableness review.260 The Court made 
its view clear when it declared, “Ours . . . is not the last word: The ball 
now lies in Congress’s court.”261 These statements indicate that Congress 
has at least some flexibility to alter the Court’s reasonableness standard 
or to abolish review for abuse of discretion, and the Court’s later cases 
are essentially interpretations of the “reasonableness review” it found 
Congress had created by statute. 
But the majority of movement has occurred on the bench, not in 
Congress. In Gall, the Court prohibited courts from adopting “rigid” 
mathematical rules that required sentencing judges to justify their 
sentences in proportion to the degree of departure. Doing so, according 
to the Court, would come “too close to creating an impermissible 
presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the [g]uideline 
range.”262 The Court also prohibited a heightened standard of review for 
sentences lying outside the guideline range.263 But unlike in Booker, the 
Court dropped its deferential language, making it unclear how much of 
the holding was constitutionally necessary and how much was just a 
common law exposition on the reasonableness review the Court created 
in Booker. In Rita, the Court held that courts of appeals could presume 
that sentences were reasonable if the sentences fell within guidelines 
ranges.264 Because the presumption was non-binding, the Court rejected 
the Petitioner’s argument that “plac[ing] an additional burden on the 
district court to justify non-Guidelines sentences” is impermissible.265 
The statement in Booker that “[t]he ball now lies in Congress’s 
court” strongly suggests that all holdings about reasonableness review 
that follow Booker are not required by the Constitution. At least one 
Justice has expressly adopted the understanding that reasonableness 
review amounts to nothing more than common law reasoning. Justice 
Thomas has repeatedly refused to join the rest of the Court’s more recent 
pronouncements about reasonableness review on the basis that “the 
Court’s decisions in this area are necessarily grounded in policy 
considerations rather than law” because the Booker remedy “has no basis 
in the statute.”266 
Even if the Court’s doctrinal pronouncements are tied to the 
Constitution, the proposal in this Article does not impinge that doctrine. 
The doctrine permits presumptions if the presumptions do not bind 
judges to the Guidelines (Rita) but not if a sufficient risk exists that the 
 260. Id. at 260, 263. 
 261. Id. at 265. 
 262. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 47 (2007). 
 263. Id. at 50–51. 
 264. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007). 
 265. Brief for the Petitioner at 33, Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (No. 06-5754). 
 266. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 114 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting); accord, e.g., 
Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 518 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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presumptions will (Gall). More importantly, the Court seems to care 
tremendously about whether an appellate standard creates presumptions 
that depend on whether the sentence is inside or outside the guideline 
range. In Rita, the presumption applied only because the sentence fell 
within a guideline range, and in Gall, an appellate court applied a rigid 
proportionality justification and a heightened form of review because it 
determined that the sentence was outside the guideline range. The Court 
refused to permit that holding. 
The proposal in this Article does not impinge on this doctrine 
because it does not tie itself to the Guidelines. Under this proposal, 
judges would not consider whether a sentence falls inside or outside a 
guideline range. And given the common, but not universal, practice of 
judges to sentence at the bottom of guideline ranges, this proposal would 
implicate sentences both inside and outside the guideline ranges. 
Although this Article uses data derived from sentences under the 
Guidelines, it does so only to define categories of similarly situated 
offenders, not to directly demarcate the boundaries between 
unreasonable and reasonable sentences, as occurred in Gall. 
This proposal also overcomes the second constitutional concern: 
whether the reform indirectly makes the Guidelines de facto mandatory. 
Admittedly, this proposal draws some parallels to the de novo form of 
review the Court excised in Booker, but those parallels are shallow. 
Before it was excised, § 3742(e) explicitly directed an appellate court to 
review whether a sentence departed from a guideline range in a way not 
authorized by the Guidelines.267 But for this proposal, whether a sentence 
is inside or outside a guideline range is immaterial. And although any 
form of stricter appellate review constrains judges somewhat, Congress 
is constitutionally capable of increasing constraints on judicial 
discretion. Congress, could, for example leave judges with no room for 
discretion by tying specific, determinate sentences to every possible 
offense. 
Under this Article’s proposal, the effective range in which judges 
could sentence would narrow, but the proposal would not introduce the 
core Sixth Amendment problem underlying Booker, which was that 
courts were required to issue certain sentences based on facts not found 
by the jury. Indeed, the whole scheme of reasonableness review 
(especially substantive reasonableness) expressly permits decreasing 
judicial discretion based on judicial fact-findings. When a court of 
appeals finds that a district judge’s sentence was substantively 
unreasonable, the court holds that the facts the judge found bounded the 
possible sentences the judge could issue. Even if the Court has carefully 
crafted within reasonableness review a balance between discretion and 
 267. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)(B) (2012). 
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uniformity, Booker states that Congress could supplant reasonableness 
review altogether. The Court’s holding in Ritathat a presumption of 
reasonableness is not unconstitutional in part because it is not 
bindingis instructive here. While this Article’s proposal constrains 
judges, it does so only to the extent it requires greater attention to 
explanations of sentences. It does not bind judges to the guideline 
ranges.268 
The strongest argument against this proposal is that any reduction 
in the range of sentences a judge can impose is unconstitutionalthat is, 
a court can review sentences only for procedural reasonableness. While 
some scholars support this position,269 the Court rejected this argument 
7-2 when Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas) asserted it,270 and the 
position has failed to gain traction since. What’s more, the proposal in 
this Article arguably functions not as a substantive constraint, but as a 
valid procedural constraint. Some lower courts might construe this 
constraint as substantive,271 but the Court’s holding in Gall explicitly 
describes as “procedural error” a judge’s “failing to adequately explain 
the chosen sentence.”272 Boiled down, this Article’s proposal merely asks 
Congress to require more explanation for outlier sentencesthat is, this 
proposal seeks to alter the goal posts for what is “adequate.” 
IV.  METHODOLOGY FOR DEFINING CATEGORIES OF  
SIMILARLY SITUATED OFFENDERS 
This part establishes a methodology the Commission could use to 
define categories of similarly situated offenders, and by wading through 
the variables the Commission uses to code the data, it shows that enough 
of the right kind of data exists to meaningfully create these categories. 
This proposal operates as a new appellate structure outside the 
Guidelines, but it depends on data drawn from a Guidelines-centered 
system. Fortunately, the Commission’s trove of sentencing data provides 
a ready opportunity to create these categories. Within thirty days of 
sentencing an offender, judges must provide detailed sentencing data to 
 268. Other scholars have argued that the Court has created a balance between discretion and 
uniformity and that a proposal is unconstitutional when it “shift[s] the delicate balance the Court has 
struck after Booker away from district court discretion towards the Guidelines.” Hessick, supra note 24, 
at 1343, 1348. Hessick identifies in the jurisprudence a uniformity ideal. But this uniformity ideal is 
derived from the Sentencing Reform Act, not the Constitution. By adopting the proposal from this Article, 
Congress would slightly shift its ideals away from those expressed in the Sentencing Reform Act. 
 269. E.g., Sarah M. R. Cravens, Judging Discretion: Contexts for Understanding the Role of 
Judgment, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 947, 966 & n.73 (2010). 
 270. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 370 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (arguing that no substantive component to reasonableness review can exist and that “district 
courts must be able . . . to sentence to the maximum of the statutory range”). 
 271. See United States v. Borho, 485 F.3d 904, 911 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 272. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 
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the Commission.273 Data files of individual and corporate sentences since 
2002 are publicly available.274 The compliance rate is also good. Courts 
gave the Commission every Judgment and Conviction order and 98.8% 
of the Statement of Reason forms in 2014.275 Courts are required to use 
these forms to record the reasons they issued a specific sentence,276 and 
these forms are the primary documents the Commission uses to code 
sentencing data. Although courts were somewhat less compliant with 
providing Pre-Sentence Reports (handing over about ninety-two 
percent), the Commission collects those reports largely to fill data gaps 
in the Statement of Reason forms. 
Even where researchers have discerned judges’ identities, the 
studies often suffer from an inability to control for case characteristics 
that affect sentencing.277 This Article’s method benefits from not needing 
judge identifiers, and it allows for control of case characteristics because 
it uses the Commission’s data, which includes thousands of data points 
for each individual offender. Among other things, the data includes the 
Guidelines code representing the statute of conviction (for example, 
section 2D1.1 for drug trafficking), the presence or absence of the 
numerous factors that go into calculating a guideline range, the circuit 
and courthouse of the sentencing proceedings, and 264 possible reasons 
a district court judge can give for departing from a guideline range.278 
Although the data set is based on Guidelines that are themselves an 
inexact tool for classifying like offenses, no better data set exists, and the 
size of this set allows one to tailor the variable choices to diminish the 
internal biases in the Guidelines. For instance, the Guidelines arguably 
place too much emphasis on drug quantity, skewing the comparison 
between drug and non-drug cases. But the data points allow one to avoid 
that bias by isolating drug offenders from other offenders. 
A. LIMITING THE PROPOSAL TO SPECIFIC OFFENSE CATEGORIES 
Measuring inter-judge disparity is already difficult; it is made 
practically impossible if researchers take steps that decimate population 
sample sizes. The more variable qualifiers used to define a category of 
similarly situated offenders, the smaller the sample size becomes. The 
proposal accordingly should be used only for appeals of offenses that are 
common enough to draw a decent sample size: notably drug, firearm, and 
 273. 28 U.S.C. § 994(w) (2012). 
 274. Commission Datafiles, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N (2017), https://www.ussc.gov/research-and-
publications/commission-datafiles. 
 275. 2014 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 107, at tbl.1. 
 276. 28 U.S.C. § 994(w)(1)(B) (2012). 
 277. See supra note 125. 
 278. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 249, at A-11–A-16; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, VARIABLE 
CODEBOOK (2014), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/ 
datafiles/Organizational_Codebook_FY00_FY14.pdf.  
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white-collar cases, which comprise about fifty-six percent of the federal 
criminal docket.279 Although immigration offenses make up a large part 
of the federal docket (twenty-nine percent in fiscal year 2015280), those 
offenses are excluded because, despite their number, the offenses create 
comparatively little opportunity for inter-judge disparity. Congress’s 
authorization of nationwide fast-track sentencingsignificant 
downward departures given to some immigration offenders who enter 
guilty pleashas significantly decreased judicial discretion.281 All 
remaining offense categories constitute only about fifteen percent of the 
federal docket. Not enough people commit these crimes to create 
sufficiently large population samples against which an individual’s 
offense can be measured. That the proposal in this Article is inapplicable 
to certain offenses does not dampen the promise of the proposal. This 
proposal does not seek an all-or-nothing revolution to make all sentences 
just; it instead adopts the ideal that sentencing some defendants in a 
more just manner is better than nothing. This proposal, moreover, works 
in part by making judges more aware of sentencing patterns within their 
districts. To that extent, this reform should have positive effects on the 
entire criminal system. 
B. SAMPLE SIZE 
Certain offense categories are excluded because of sample size 
issues, but even offenses that are included must not be considered if no 
sufficient sample size of like offenders exists. The Commission can tailor 
the sample size to specific offenses or even to specific districts. For 
instance, the Commission might allow a smaller sample size in districts 
that have historically suffered worse inter-judge disparity. But a sample 
size of twenty-five similarly situated offenders should ordinarily be 
sufficient. This sample size ensures that some measure of sentencing 
pattern can be drawn in a district. A larger sample size would risk 
eliminating many smaller districts from consideration. Even this sample 
size eliminates some districtsalthough the opportunity for inter-judge 
disparity in those districts is comparatively smaller. 
The sample should be taken from the previous three years of 
offenders for which data is available. This compromises between a need 
 279. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2015 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics fig.A (2016) 
https://www.ussc.gov/research/sourcebook-2015. 
 280. Id. 
 281. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21 § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (The Commission 
shall promulgate “a policy statement authorizing a downward departure of not more than 4 levels if 
the Government files a motion for such departure pursuant to an early disposition program authorized 
by the Attorney General and the United States Attorney.”); Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy 
Attorney Gen., to all United States Attorneys 2 (Jan. 31, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/ 
default/files/dag/legacy/2012/01/31/fast-track-program.pdf (permitting fast-track sentencing in all 
districts). 
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to reach a sufficient sample size and the recognition both that sentencing 
patterns are dynamically tied to changes in judges, Guidelines, and 
statutory law and that permitting too much of a backward-bias makes it 
harder to induce future sentencing changes. Additionally, this 
compromise recognizes that the choice of year introduces complexities; 
Guidelines amendments ordinarily take effect on November 1 instead of 
at the beginning of a regular calendar year.282 Where major amendments 
have been added to the Guidelines, the Commission can make exceptions 
or create a formula by which offenders in previous years can be compared 
to current offenders.283 
C. CHOICE OF FACTORS 
The strength of this proposal lies not only in the more-abstract call 
for more stringent appellate review, but also in the ability to view the data 
and establish that the data could be used to define categories of similarly 
situated offenders. For that purpose, this Subpart outlines suggested 
factors the Commission could use to craft those categories. But the 
proposal does not depend on the acceptance or rejection of each of these 
suggested factors. This Subpart suggests each factor largely for 
prudential reasons. This Article defines categories of similarly situated 
offenders as those offenders in the past three available years who have 









 282. A possible way around this problem would be to include the variables that detail the 
sentencing date, but even that solution is imperfect. The sentencing date does not necessarily detail 
the offense date, and defense litigation often focuses on which Guidelines Manual applies. Traveling 
down this rabbit hole risks drowning the usefulness of this proposal in complexity. This proposal 
strikes a balance between pragmatic simplicity and the precision that comes from considering more 
variables. 
 283. For example, after the changes to the drug quantity tables took place on November 1, 2014, 
many drug offenders became eligible for adjusted sentences based on guideline ranges two levels 
below what the same offenders previously received. In comparing current offenders to earlier 
offenders, the Commission could keep the analysis the samethat is, modern offenders would be 
compared with those receiving the same guideline ranges pre-2014 but who had lower drug quantities. 
But if there is good evidence, for example, that judges across the board found the drug penalties too 
harsh and that the drug quantity table was reduced to reflect current sentencing patterns, not a policy 
change, then it will be appropriate to compare modern offenders with earlier offenders who had higher 
guideline ranges. 
 284. For a list of the Commission’s variables that correlate with these traits, see infra Appendix. 
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 District of sentencing 
 Guideline section dictating which category of offense conduct 
was used to sentence the offender285 
 Applicable guideline range in months, reflecting all 
adjustments minus acceptance of responsibility 
 Criminal history score 
 Acceptance or nonacceptance of responsibility; and 
 Application or nonapplication of a mandatory minimum. 
Because this reform is premised on shifting the location of the 
conversation, stricter precisionwhich would require a greater number 
of variablesis unnecessary. Indeed, including more variables would 
complicate the calculations and decimate sample sizes. 
1.   Factors Included 
Of the six factors stated above, five require little explanation. Their 
relevance is easy to see. For instance, the Guidelines offense category 
ensures that appellate courts compare offenders who have similar 
criminal conduct, and the variable for acceptance of responsibility 
ensures that offenders with similar culpabilities are compared. 
(Acceptance of responsibility is not included in the variable for the 
calculated guideline range.) The researchers in the study about the 
Southern District of California lumped offenders into the same category 
if they committed drug trafficking crimes, were subject to mandatory 
minimums, and had received the benefits of the safety valve (thus 
ensuring that they had the same criminal history).286 This Article adopts 
a similar comparison but also considers acceptance of responsibility and 
narrows the population samples to offenders who have the same 
calculated guideline ranges.287 
Limiting consideration of data to the specific district of sentencing 
requires greater explanation. This reform is oriented toward the narrow 
purpose of reducing inter-judge disparity, not transforming the entire 
sentencing system. The ideal variable regarding geography should 
therefore be tailored as much as practicable to include sentences issued 
by any judge who could ordinarily sentence the specific offender. It is 
 285. This variable is admittedly imperfect because the conduct of some offenders requires 
calculating multiple different Guidelines sections and choosing the highest calculation. Thus, the 
conduct of offenders with the same calculation might diverge more than might be immediately 
apparent. 
 286. Mason & Bjerk, supra note 125, at 191. 
 287. This proposal does lose some information used in the California Study. The existence of a 
safety valve does not merely clue a judge into the criminal history of an offender; it also signals to the 
judge whether the offense was violent and the offender’s relative role in the offense, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(f)factors this proposal considers only indirectly. 
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only with respect to those judges that an individual can experience  
inter-judge disparity because judges ordinarily cannot sentence 
offenders outside the district in which an offense was committed.288 
Descriptive and practical reasons favor limiting geography by 
district and not further narrowing the scope to specific courthouses. 
First, offenders in some districts can be randomly assigned to any 
courthouse within a district.289 Second, using a variable covering the 
entire district helps ensure that a sufficiently large population sample can 
be drawn. Finally, the location of a crime within a district is sometimes 
as arbitrary as the assigning of an individual offender to a specific judge. 
It makes some difference, but not much, that a police officer might find 
drugs during a routine traffic stop close to the ultimate delivery location 
in, say, Hartford, Connecticut, than merely in route in New Haven or 
Bridgeport. This criticism is, of course, applicable where somebody is 
apprehended in New York for an eventual delivery to Bridgeport, but 
interstate travelbecause it requires intrastate travelis necessarily less 
common. 
One could increase the population sample sizes for categories of 
similarly situated offenders by considering, in the alternative, all 
offenders across all districts. But that consideration is better tailored 
toward reducing inter-district disparity, which does not necessarily 
reduce inter-judge disparity. For instance, the disparity between two 
districts can be zero even if judges within each district diverge from other 
judges on the same court. Because this Article seeks to reduce inter-judge 
disparity, limiting review district-by-district is more appropriate for this 
proposal. 
Furthermore, some inter-district disparity is healthy to a sentencing 
regime, even if the Sentencing Reform Act has rejected that value, 
whereas no affirmative direct benefit to inter-judge disparity exists. For 
instance, Guidelines-identical firearms crimes do not have the same level 
of harm when committed in rural Wyoming than in Manhattan, and it is 
understandable that two judges might sentence those offenders 
differently. It is precisely because not all statutorily identical crimes are 
equal that the Guidelines prescribes ranges in the first place, yet most 
judges ignore the purpose of those ranges by almost always sentencing at 
the low end of the guideline range. Moreover, even if the harm of a crime 
is identical in different districts, the harm to different localities of 
 288. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(C)(3)(D). One notable exception to this rule is the opportunity for judges 
who have taken senior status to sit by designation in other districts. 28 U.S.C. § 294(d) (2012). But 
while those judges may bring their sentencing practices and biases from their home districts, their 
sentences should be compared with other in-district sentences. 
 289. D. CONN. L. R. CRIM. P. 50 (2009) (requiring only that cases be assigned “in accordance with 
a general policy . . . in the interest of the effective administration of justice”). The District of Minnesota 
also has assigned cases “without regard to the division in which the case arose.” D. MINN. ORDER FOR 
ASSIGNMENT OF CASES 7 (Dec. 1, 2008). 
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incarceration changes between districts. The incidental harms of 
incarceration are arguably worse in areas where the incarceration rate is 
already high, and federal law has underappreciated that phenomenon in 
its haste to make a federal case of many issues that used to fall within the 
sole province of the states.290 Pursuing too vigorously an ideal of inter-
district uniformity also removes one of the largest checks on the severity 
of the federal system and undermines state policy.291 
2.   Factors Excluded 
Here, too, this Article’s choice reflects a compromise between 
precision and practicality. The drug quantity table often dictates the 
same offense level for two offenders who have wildly varying drug 
quantities (for example, fifteen kilograms of cocaine versus  
forty-nine),292 but judges may reasonably sentence such Guidelines-
identical offenders differently. One could further narrow the categories 
of similarly situated offenders by controlling drug quantities more 
precisely, but this line-by-line comparison of every factor the 
Commission collects would do nothing more than to reveal that each 
crime is uniquea useless exercise when trying to determine which 
offenders are similar. 
That comparison would ensure that an appropriate sample size 
never arose. So, too, would an approach that considered every 
enhancement or reduction. For example, the offense category for theft 
and embezzlement includes nineteen specific offense characteristics,293 
and requiring offenders to match each of those factors would rapidly 
diminish the population sample. 
Instead, this proposal recognizes that the internal logic of the 
Guidelines asserts that offenders are similarly situated based on the 
calculated guideline ranges alone. Because this reform, at its core, 
accepts the Guidelines logic, Congress could more feasibly adopt this 
proposal because it departs less from current policy. The conversion of 
these variables into a common currency is admittedly a legal fiction. In 
reality, the Guidelines place inordinate weight on certain 
factorsnotably drug quantity and loss amount.294 But a lot of these 
 290. See, e.g., Michael M. O’Hear, National Uniformity/Local Uniformity: Reconsidering the Use 
of Departures to Reduce Federal-State Sentencing Disparities, 87 IOWA L. REV. 721, 723 (2002). 
 291. Id. at 753–65 (arguing that courts have too readily pursued an ideal of national uniformity at 
the expense of an ideal of local uniformity, which is equally valid under federal law). 
 292. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(C) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
 293. Id. at § 2B1.1(b). 
 294. For economic crimes, the Guidelines have the potential to place far more weight on the 
economic loss of a crime than for an offender’s relative role in the offense. In United States v. Adelson, 
441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), the court rejected the government’s request for a Guidelines 
life sentence. Noting that the practically inevitable decline in stock prices that follows from the 
revelation of fraud can have a tremendously large loss impact when that decline happens across 
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biases are contained to specific sentencing categories (such as drug 
quantity). To get rid of these biases, this Article does not fully accept the 
assertion of the Guidelines that any two offenders with the same 
calculated range are similar. It instead accepts that assertion only when 
two offenders committed the same statutory offense. This Article further 
limits the sample with five other elements, which mitigates the internal 
biases of the Guidelines. 
A precise comparison between offenders also is not needed for a 
proposal that reduces inter-judge disparity. By making certain sentences 
subject to unreasonableness presumptions, this proposal will induce 
judges to include greater justifications for their sentences and to become 
more familiar with the sentencing practices of other judges on the same 
court. By nature, determining who is a victim or beneficiary of  
inter-judge disparity is difficult because no baseline “correct” sentence 
exists from which to measure a departure. But the strength of this 
proposal is that it will ameliorate sentences in general by increasing 
awareness of district-wide sentencing practices. 
The methodology for this proposal omits other variables in part 
because even the Guidelines contain no method for comparing those 
variables. One such area is the hundreds of reasons judges may choose 
for departing from a guideline range, none of which are quantified and 
millions of shares, the court stated that the loss table “may lead to guidelines offense levels that are, 
quite literally, off the chart” and are “patently absurd.” Id. at 509, 515. 
The loss table is located at section 2B1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, but in a sense 
of rigid display, the Guidelines apply the loss table to a host of rather diverse crimes, and it is far from 
obvious that a loss amount in one crime applies to an equivalent fiscal loss amount in another. For 
instance, the loss table comes into play for the “volume of commerce attributable” to a defendant 
broadcasting obscene material, section 2G3.2, or merely transporting it, section 2G3.1. But it also 
applies to insider trading gains, section 2B1.4, and the destruction of fish, other wildlife, and plants, 
section 2Q2.1. Furthermore, it is not even clear that loss amount is an appropriate measure to begin 
with. Embezzlement of one million dollars that destroys a small company and puts thirty people 
completely out of work may be more devastating than a loss ten times as high that is spread loosely 
among ten million passive investors. Also controversial is how a loss is calculated in the first place. 
Some courts have applied a market-capitalization measure of damages, looking at the average value 
decrease per share multiplied by the number of shares. Cf. United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 542 
(5th Cir. 2005) (reporting that the district court had sentenced according to the loss in stock price to 
a shareholder, without regard to any other factor that might affect stock price). This method of loss 
calculation is overly simplistic; it does not take into account the price at which shares were purchased 
or the multitude of factors that affect share price. Two-thirds of the loss in Olis occurred either before 
or more than a week after the problems were revealed. Id. at 548. Because market capitalization can 
drive a sentence, some have called for a separate guideline for those offenses. The Reform of Federal 
Sentencing for Economic Crimes, AM. BAR ASS’N. CRIMINAL JUSTICE TASK FORCE 9 (Nov. 10, 2014), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminaljustice/economic_crimes.au
thcheckdam.pdf. The Commission recently amended the Guidelines to help ameliorate this problem. 
Previously, the Guidelines required courts to presume that market capitalization loss provided a 
reasonable estimate of the actual loss. Now, the Guidelines allow courts to use “any method that is 
appropriate and practicable.” U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 25, 
30 (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/official-text-
amendments/20150430_Amendments_0.pdf. 
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many of which are inherently incomparable. One variable asks whether 
a sentence “[a]fford[s] adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.”295 That 
variable will mean two very different things for different 
offendersespecially if “deterrence” can refer to specific deterrence, not 
only general deterrence. 
Finally, this Article groups together all offenders who received a 
mandatory minimum sentence and, separately, all who do not, regardless 
of the reason the court did not apply a mandatory minimum. This latter 
choice respects that the Commission considers offenders who were never 
subject to a mandatory minimum to be similarly situated to those who 
were simply granted a reprieve.296 
3.   The Complexity of Guideline Amendments 
One noticeable omission from this Article’s choice of factors is any 
consideration of recent Guidelines amendments. Major amendments can 
make comparing sentences of offenders over a course of years difficult. 
This proposal begins at a base level of generality and calls for the 
Commission to complicate the analysis only where necessary. 
Considering amendments at the general stage risks overcomplicating this 
reform. For one thing, fashioning a rule for all amendments would be 
overbroad. For another, amendments ordinarily take effect on November 
1 instead of at the beginning of a calendar year. If amendments were 
taken into account, then additional variables (such as date of sentencing) 
would need to be considered, further complicating this proposal. 
Some amendments can be ignored altogether if the effect of the 
amendments is minute, because offenders sentenced before and after the 
amendment will often still be similar. But for other amendments, the 
Commission should draft special policy statements that instruct judges 
on how those judges should consider specific amendments. 
V.  CONCRETE EXAMPLES 
Previous proposals, notably Mark Osler’s, have suggested inserting 
the sentencing data into a computer-based algorithm to determine what 
sentence should issue. But providing concrete examples was beyond the 
 295. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 249, at A-11. 
 296. This choice is a bit imperfect. The main reasons for departing from a mandatory 
minimumsubstantial assistance and the safety valve—are not completely comparable. Congress has 
stated that imposing a lower sentence than the mandatory minimum is “general[ly] appropriate[]” 
when an offender has rendered substantial assistance. 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (2012). In contrast, a court 
“shall impose” a non-mandatory minimum sentence if the offender is eligible for the safety valve.  
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). But Booker effectively nullified any distinction between “may” and “shall,” 
diminishing the distinction between the two categories. The only real difference is that, with substantial 
assistance, the government sometimes suggests a departure amount, and the judge sometimes obliges 
because judges are supposed to consider “the government’s evaluation of the assistance rendered.” U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1(a)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
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scope of those articles. The following examples demonstrate how the 
proposal in this Article would work in practice. 
A. DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 
The three graphs below represent sentencing patterns in the District 
of Massachusetts from 2011 to 2014. These charts represent, for three 
guideline ranges, offenders sentenced in that district who were sentenced 
under section 2D1.1 (drug trafficking), had criminal history scores of 1, 
received a three-level sentence reduction due to acceptance of 
responsibility, and did not receive a mandatory minimum sentence. 
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Consistent with earlier remarks on the topic, sentences tend to 
aggregate toward the bottom boundary of a guideline range. In each of 
these cases, not one offender received higher than the range 
minimumindicating that there may be less inter-judge disparity within 
guideline ranges in this district. However, some judges frequently 
sentence elsewhere in a guideline range, meaning that an offender can 
receive a noticeably harsher intra-guideline range sentence based 
entirely on judicial identity. This further establishes the need to develop 
a system that can wrestle with disparity that occurs within a calculated 
guideline range. 
Several spikes appear in each of these graphs. The spikes in both 
Figure 2 and Figure 4 appear at the guideline range minimum, at 0 
(representing a non-prison sentence), and in between. Additionally, no 
discernible correlation exists between the mid-point spike and an 
identifiable trend in downward departures or variances. One could 
understand a mid-point spike if it correlated with a reduction in an 
offense level, but the absence of a correlation with the bottom of a 
guideline range suggests that some judges are issuing specific sentences 
without discernible input from the pertinent guideline ranges. For 
instance, the mid-point spike in Figure 3 is 24 months, but that number 
does not represent a range minimum or maximum from the sentencing 
table. Only the spike in Figure 2 correlates with an actual guideline range, 
but it represents a six-point reduction in the calculated guideline range. 
Guidelines policies, however, typically provide for a two- or three-point 
reduction. 
The graphs also demonstrate how this reform would work. Figure 2 
includes no sentences that would be presumed unreasonable because the 
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sentences, meaning no category of sentence falls wholly within the 
bottom or top fifteen percent of sentences. But in Figure 3, the court of 
appeals would presume that the sentences of 0, 1, 2,297 41, or 46 months 
were unreasonable. Sentencing judges could rebut these presumptions 
by providing sufficiently compelling justifications, which themselves 
would have ameliorating effects on the sentences given to other 
offenders. For Figure 4, the court of appeals would presume that any 
sentence of 0 months or 87 months was unreasonable. 
B. WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI 
These charts represent, for four guideline ranges, offenders 
sentenced in in the same three-year span in the Western District of 
Missouri who were sentenced under section 2D1.1 (drug trafficking), had 
criminal history scores of 1, received a three-level sentence reduction 
because of acceptance of responsibility, and did not receive a mandatory 
minimum sentence. 
 












 297. To reduce the complexity of the horizontal axis, this Article organizes the data in bins. The  

















DIVINE-69.3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/2018 4:00 PM 
April 2018]            BOOKER DISPARITY AND DATA-DRIVEN SENTENCING 829 




















































DIVINE-69.3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/2018 4:00 PM 
830  HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:771 




In each of these four figures, one spike relates to the guideline range 
minimum, and another relates to the minimum for a two-level reduction 
from the applicable range minimum. Thus, unlike the data from the 
District of Massachusetts, the data indicates that some judges apply a de 
facto two-level reduction after calculating the guideline ranges, perhaps 
under a belief that the Guidelines are two levels too harsh. And no 
common variable is apparent among the offenders who received de facto 
two-level reductions. Additionally, in each of Figures 5, 6 and 7 at least 
one judge deviated from the norm that offenders should be sentenced at 
the bottom of a range, indicating possible inter-judge disparity within the 
guideline range. 
It is easy to see how the proposal in this Article would play out in 
these situations. The court of appeals would presume that the sentences 
up to and including sixteen months in Figure 5 were unreasonable. The 
same is true for the forty-three month sentence (but not the thirty month 
sentences, as that sentencing bucket, although above the eighty-fifth 
percentile, also includes percentages below the eighty-fifth percentile). 
In Figure 6, the court of appeals would presume that everybody 
sentenced to eighteen months or less, as well as the individual sentenced 
to forty one months, received an unreasonable sentence. In Figure 7, 
offenders sentenced to twenty-four months or less would have the 
opportunity to appeal, as well as the offender sentenced to fifty-two 
 298. The sentences in the 58-month bin of Figure 8 (all sentences greater than 56 months but less 
than or equal to 58 months) were all equal to 57 months, which represents the new range minimum 
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months and the offender sentenced to sixty months. The offenders 
sentenced to forty-six months would not be able to appeal because that 
bucket falls both above and below the eighty-fifth percentile. In Figure 8, 
the sentences up to and including forty months would be presumed 
unreasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
Studies consistently show a significant increase in inter-judge 
disparity after Booker. While Booker removed many of the worst 
qualities of the Sentencing Reform Act, it also removed the aspect of the 
Act that most effectively reduced inter-judge disparity. Decisions of the 
Supreme Court after Booker have gutted any meaningful appellate 
review, which has left the federal sentencing system inept at curtailing 
inter-judge disparity. This problem is likely to grow worse as newer 
judgesless anchored to the Guidelines than those who sentenced under 
the mandatory Guidelinesjoin the bench. 
Scholars have floated many proposals to change the Guidelines, but 
these proposals have been poorly tailored to reducing inter-judge 
disparity. Some of the proposals also make the same mistakes the 
Sentencing Reform Act did, and they have neglected to address 
constitutional questions raised by their proposals. Instead, reducing 
inter-judge disparity requires not a new set of Guidelines, but a 
heightened form of appellate review, and the Commission’s data set 
provides a prime opportunity for creating a form of review unimaginable 
at the time Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act. 
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APPENDIX 
All data referenced in this Article is publicly available on the 
Commission’s website.299 Courts are required to provide the Commission 
with detailed data regarding a sentence within thirty days of that 
sentence.300 The Commission then strips this data of identifying 
information (for example, judge’s and offender’s identities, case number) 
but still leaves up to thousands of different variables regarding the 
sentences. The Commission derives this data from a number of sources, 
including the Statement of Reason form, the Pre-Sentence Report (if 
necessary), the Judgment and Conviction Order, and in some instances 
the plea agreement.301 
SPSS or SAS software can extract the information, although SAS 
cannot extract all the variables, including potentially relevant factors 
such as the offender’s age, sentencing date, the loss amount from a crime, 
the date an offense of conviction began and ended, and (critically) 
whether a non-incarceration sentence was issued.302 
After extracting the data, appropriate sentencing characteristics 
were isolated to find sentencing patterns: 
 CIRCDIST: the district in which the offender was sentenced. 
 GDLINEHI: the sentencing guideline, showing the section of 
the Guidelines under which the offender’s highest range was 
calculated. 
 XCRHISSR: the criminal history score of the offender. 
 GLMIN and GLMAX: the calculated guideline range, 
including all chapter adjustments but excluding acceptance of 
responsibility. 
 STATMIN: the existence and amount of any applicable 
mandatory minimum. 
 ACCTRESP: the existence, and offense level reduction, 
attributable to acceptance of responsibility. 
 MAND_: whether a mandatory minimum was applicable and 
was applied. 
 SENTTOT0: The total monthly prison sentence, including 
probation as “0” values. 
 SENTMON & SENTYR: the month and year of sentencing. 
 299. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 274. 
 300. 28 U.S.C. § 994(w) (2012). 
 301. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 249, at 2. 
 302. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 249, at 9, 29, 34, 41–42. 
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 REAS_: The reason(s) given for a sentence imposed outside 
the range. 
 BOOKERCD: The generalized description (twelve possible 
values) for whether a sentence fell outside the range and for 
what generalized reason.303 
After isolating the variables, the data was filtered into common 
factors. Similarly situated offenders were defined as those who were 
sentenced in the same district (“CIRCDIST”), under the same Guidelines 
section (“GDLINEHI”), with the same criminal history calculation 
(“XCRHISSR”), whose calculations fell within the same range 
(“GLMIN”) and (“GLMAX”), who had the same status and applicable 
offense level reduction for acceptance of responsibility (“ACCTRESP”), 
and who either had a mandatory minimum applied or who did not 
(“MAND_”).304 The remaining variables, for example (“REAS_”) were 
used to discern whether the disparities and spikes in the sentencing data 
were explainable by some other readily identifiable factor. For instance, 
after discovering consistent twin spikes in Figures 5-8, the REAS_ factors 
were reviewed, which come in almost 300 varieties,305 to make sure no 
discernible pattern suggested that one or more factors contributed to 
disparately spiked sentences. Although a judge could list dozens or even 
hundreds of reasons for a departure, judges overwhelmingly issued 
either no reason at all or just one. 
 303. The underscore (“_”) denotes a placeholder. For instance, an offender’s data can include hundreds 
of possible reasons for a departure under the variable REAS_ (for example REAS1, REAS2, REAS3). 
 304. This variable was used in conjunction with the variable STATMIN. If an offender had a 
mandatory minimum applied, relying on both these variables helps determine whether the sentence 
was the mandatory minimum or whether a sentence above the mandatory minimum was applied. 
 305. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 249, at A-11–A-16. 
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